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I. INTRODUCTION 
While Chinese claims to the South China Sea territories remain constant, 
Beijing’s approach to the disputed territories has changed over time.  For centuries, China 
asserted its claims in the South China Sea through publicized proclamations of 
sovereignty and little else.  After World War II (WWII), the Chinese approach shifted 
from legal proclamations to military occupations, then to diplomatic negotiations, and, 
most recently, to agreements for cooperative exploration efforts with other claimants, 
shelving the sovereignty issue for the foreseeable future. 
The South China Sea issue centers around the Spratly Islands dispute, which 
involves six claimants – the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China 
(ROC or Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei.  Also important are the 
Paracel Islands dispute, which involves only the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and, the 
Natuna Islands dispute, involving a conflict between the southern tip of Chinese claims 
and Indonesia’s claim to an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ).1  The disputed islets in the 
South China Sea are not habitable nor even visible all of the time, submerged by the tides 
a large portion of the year.  However, as China and Southeast Asian nations continue 
industrializing, the promise of petroleum and natural gas deposits regularly brings these 
territorial claims into the spotlight, particularly the Spratly Islands.  Shortly after energy 
firms began speculating about the size of the resource fields, all claimants made or 
reiterated declarations of their claims and all but Brunei and Indonesia have deployed 
military forces to patrol “their” waters. 
Five Asian armed forces currently occupy various portions of the Spratly Islands; 
the PRC occupies seven reefs, Vietnam 24 islets and reefs, Malaysia five reefs, the 
Philippines eight islets, and Taiwan has a garrison on one islet.2  While the overlapping 
claims have existed for centuries, the clashes did not begin until after the initiation of the 
first surveys of potential oil and gas fields in the region in the 1970s.  Over the past three 
decades, there have been 13 military clashes in the South China Sea region, nine of which 
 
1 Anton Nugroho, “The Dragon Looks South,” Proceedings. vol. 126, no. 3 (Annapolis: United States 
Naval Institute. Mar 2000), 74-76. 
2 Ibid. 
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involved the PRC, although the region has been relatively free of military action between 
claimants since 1999.  Consequently, it appears that until the year 2000, most of the 
claimants were willing to militarily assert and defend their claims to South China Sea 
territory.  The most notable development in this apparent trend towards peaceful 
resolution is the 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct on Parties in the South China Sea,” 
the first multilateral security document between China and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The logic behind these claims ranges from historical precedence, primarily based 
on ancient documentation, to claims of archipelagic status, and even abandonment and 
subsequent “re-discovery.”  The legitimacy of all such claims to sovereignty is suspect at 
best.  However, what is truly noteworthy is that the claimants’ approaches to these 
territories changed from mere declarations of sovereignty, to hotly contested exchanges 
that, over the past three decades included military clashes and casualties, and most 
recently, to diplomatic negotiations and cooperative exploration efforts.  There are 
numerous explanations for why these nations continue to dispute others’ claims to this 
region.  This thesis focuses primarily on the Chinese claims and assertions. 
One explanation is that one or more actors have taken action to physically and 
politically validate their claims and that these actions began a chain reaction of similar 
assertions and counter-assertions.  This explanation is particularly popular in Beijing, 
where the PRC government regularly declares that the other claimants, knowing full well 
that the South China Sea is Chinese sovereign territory, took advantage of a weak China 
in the early 20th century and that from the 1970s through the 1990s, Beijing merely acted 
to recover these “lost territories.”   
This ties in with another explanation – that China strives to establish control over 
its South China Sea claims in order to establish a foothold to dominate the region, 
ostensibly to re-establish the purported patron-client relationship of earlier dynasties, or 
least to better protect China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs).  Proponents of this 
view argue that China’s continued economic and military rise pressures Southeast Asian 
nations to accommodate China and, consequently, we see some dispute resolutions that 
are arguably pro-Beijing.   
3 
The most frequently encountered explanation is that natural resources lie at the 
heart of these disputes.  Those advocating this view argue that the territorial disputes 
remained on the back burner until Western energy companies began researching the 
region’s petroleum and natural gas deposits. 
Briefly, this thesis finds that all claims to sovereignty over these territories are 
equally suspect; it is unclear whether anyone held clear and recognizable sovereignty 
over them before WWII.  Simply put, the assertion that China merely reacted to others 
does not withstand the weight of empirical evidence.  Neither does the argument that 
China is actively seeking hegemony over the region.  Chinese actions are not clearly 
hegemonic, though they are geared towards the pursuit and attainment of Chinese 
national interests, most importantly, access to natural resources and markets to facilitate 
China’s continual economic growth.  The thesis will show that China’s rate of export 
clearly decreases following episodes of Chinese military aggression and argues that, in 
light of Beijing’s continued prioritization of economic growth, this trend plays a large 
role in its acceptance of multilateralism. 
The thesis will proceed as follows; Chapter II reviews the modern nature of the 
disputes and the explanations behind why China continues to dispute the other’s South 
China Sea claims.  The chapter briefly discusses the role of international law in the 
disputes and two explanations for the China’s continued assertion of its claims; Beijing’s 
desire to establish regional hegemony and its desire to guarantee access to the region’s 
natural resources.  What is clear is that over the past four decades, China’s approach to 
the South China Sea territorial disputes has changed.  China militarily asserted its claims 
in the Paracels, seizing several from South Vietnam in 1974.  The 1980s and early 1990s 
yielded several sharp swings, from quiet diplomacy, to strong rhetoric, to military action, 
both offensive and defensive in nature.  After the 1990s, the claimants shifted from 
military assertions to diplomatic negotiations with the most recent twist being China’s 
acceptance of a multilateral declaration on conduct in the South China Sea in 2002. 
Chapter III investigates the reasons behind this shift in China’s approach to the 
disputes.  First, the chapter identifies and reviews two clear trends from 1995 through 
today.  There is a discernible decrease in Chinese offensive military actions in the South 
4 
China Sea region, a marked professionalization and modernization of the Chinese 
military, and an increase in the experience and quality of China’s diplomatic corps.  The 
latest change in Beijing’s approach to the disputes is its acceptance of multilateral 
diplomacy.  ASEAN members pressed the Chinese for this since the early 1990s, but 
Beijing rejected this approach, limiting negotiations to bilateral efforts only.  However, in 
2002, China signed the Sino-ASEAN “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea.”  While not as legally binding as a code of conduct, the declaration is the first 
time Beijing agreed with all of the ASEAN claimants not to seize more territories in the 
region.  This thesis addresses several reasons why China altered its approach, ultimately 
providing a possible answer to the larger question, what drives Chinese foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia? 
Chapter III examines four possible factors: the effects of increased interaction 
with international diplomacy; the evolution of China’s bureaucracy and government; 
differences in the current leadership vis-à-vis previous generations; and, finally, the 
effects of China’s military actions on its economic trade and vice-versa.  Constructivists 
argue that Chinese interactions with the international diplomacy regime reshape China’s 
norms and behaviors to mimic the more peaceful, institutionalized methods often 
associated with the United States.  China’s approach to diplomacy since 2000 is certainly 
more peaceful than in previous decades.  Another reason for this may be the evolution of 
China’s diplomatic corps and government officials.  Beijing has certainly increased the 
PRC’s level of international interaction since it assumed China’s representation in the 
United Nations and other international bodies from Taipei in the 1970s.  However, this 
interaction may not be what drives China’s adoption of “normal” preferences and actions 
– Beijing may merely have learned how to play the game.  Yet another explanation for 
new approaches to Chinese foreign policy, specifically in the South China Sea region, is 
the changing nature of the perceptions held by China’s leadership.  Today’s Chinese 
leaders, known as the “fourth generation,” are vastly different from their predecessors, 
with dissimilar upbringing, educational opportunities, and environments.  Ostensibly, 
these variations bred different leaders with different perceptions of themselves, their 
nation, and the actors and environment comprising the international system.  Lastly, this 
thesis examines the relationship between Chinese military actions in the South China Sea 
5 
                                                
and its trade with ASEAN, the United States, and the industrial nations of Europe.  This 
relationship may provide a potential validation of economic interdependence theory, and 
if so, would further serve to guide U.S. policy towards resolution of the South China Sea 
disputes. 
In Chapter IV, the thesis examines the potential for U.S. involvement in a conflict 
over the South China Sea territories and finds that the potential remains low.  However, 
the U.S. does have one formal defense obligation in the region, a mutual defense treaty 
with the Republic of the Philippines.  Additionally, the United States signed a 
memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation with Brunei in 2004.  The U.S. 
security relationship with Malaysia and Indonesia is less formal, and the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) has both brought their governments closer to the United States while 
arguably driving a wedge between some of their people.  U.S. national interests in the 
region demand some semblance of U.S. involvement.  The United States is one of 
ASEAN’s largest trading partners, importing almost U.S.$85 billion from ASEAN in 
2004, while ASEAN imported just over half that amount from the United States during 
the same year.3  However, over 220 million metric tons of goods and commodities sailed 
through the South China Sea in 2003, making continued freedom of navigation for 
U.S.-flagged vessels undeniably important.4  Also effecting the U.S. approach to the 
region and the territorial disputes, are several trends in Southeast Asia.   
After over a decade of decreased continual military presence in the region, the 
United States is back.  The GWOT has spurred a massive effort to boost U.S. interaction 
and coordination with Southeast Asian governments, militaries, and law enforcement 
agencies.  However, while some welcome the U.S. return others remain unsure about, or 
even outright hostile to the United States.  The resultant effect of these two forces is a 
roller coaster on which the United States must continuously monitor and manage its 
image in the region.  Outside of cooperation regarding the GWOT, many ASEAN nations 
press politics and economics over military solutions to regional problems.  This possible  
3 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: IMF 
Publication Services, 2005), 515. 
4 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics. “Table 1-9 U.S. Waterborne 
Foreign Trade 2000,” Maritime Trade & Transportation 2002 BTS 02-01 2002, 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/maritime_trade_and_transportation/2002/index.html.  Accessed: 13 
October 2005.
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deviation from the historical balance of power approach to international relations means 
that the United States must evolve its approach as well.  In light of the increased 
Sino-ASEAN engagement, the United States should at least review, if not adjust, its 
South China Sea policy.  In the mid-1990s, China launched what some call a “charm 
offensive” in Southeast Asia, initially establishing several bilateral agreements, and in the 
early 2000s, agreements with ASEAN as a collective body on trade and investment.  
China’s response to the Asian financial crisis in 1996-97 appears to have changed the 
perception of several Southeast Asian governments regarding China’s rise, Beijing’s 
foreign policy, and the South China Sea territorial disputes.  This changing environment 
directly affects the options for the U.S.-South China Sea policy and the successful pursuit 
and attainment of U.S. interests in the region. 
The current U.S. policy is essentially a hands-off approach.  Until the 1995 
Mischief Reef incident, the United States had no official policy regarding the disputes 
and the rise of a Sino-Philippines row in the region elicited only a lukewarm statement 
regarding the sanctity of freedom of navigation.  The possible alternatives for U.S. policy 
that this thesis assesses include: 1) staying the course, essentially doing nothing; 2) 
backing one of the claimants, specifically the Republic of the Philippines; 3) building a 
coalition against Chinese claims; 4) establishing a formal, regional body to address the 
disputes, possibly the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); and, 5) pressuring the claimants 
to settle the disputes through an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  This thesis 
recommends that the United States continue efforts to prevent any encroachment of its 
freedom of navigation throughout the region.  For the short term, the United States should 
publicly and enthusiastically support the 2002 Sino-ASEAN declaration and emphasize 
its monitoring and enforcement, in the spirit of the UNCLOS, but not in full accordance 
with the UN convention.  For the long term, the United States should continue pressing 
for a more binding code of conduct, which guarantees freedom of navigation through the 
South China Sea. 
These disputes endure despite the increased globalization of the region’s 
economies, politics, and, to a degree, even their security.  Chapter II briefly presents the 
modern history of the disputed claims and examines the reasons for this endurance. 
 
II. REASONS FOR CHINA’S CONTINUATION OF THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei assert sovereignty claims over some or all of 
the Spratly or Nansha (南沙) Islands; China and Vietnam both claim the Paracel or Xisha 
(西沙), and Indonesia claims the Natuna Gulf as part of its Economic Exclusion Zone 
(EEZ), which conflicts with the southern tip of Chinese claims. 5   The continued 
industrialization of China, Taiwan and the Southeast Asian nations greatly increases their 
thirst for petroleum and natural gas, a thirst some believe the deposits these territories 
hold could help to quench.  Armed forces from five Asian nations occupy different 
holdings in the Spratly Islands, while Indonesia is the only nation to occupy the Natuna 
Islands.6
 
Figure 1.   National Claims in the Spratly Islands 7                                                  
5 Nugroho. 
6 Ibid. 
7 South China Sea Virtual Library. “Territorial Claims – Outline,” 
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/maps/oilclaims.gif.  Accessed: 13 October 2005. 
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 Some claimant governments maintain that they have held sovereignty over their 
South China Sea territories for centuries, in some cases even millennia, while others’ 
claims are relatively recent, ironically based on the idea that the original sovereigns 
abandoned the islands and features allowing them to be “re-discovered.”  While some 
nations invoke archipelagic status and EEZs to legitimize their claims, others rely on 
historical documents and precedents, particularly in the Spratlys.  This chapter briefly 
reviews the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and argues that the 
convention is at least partly to blame for the Chinese and other claimants’ 
island-grabbing campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, these are not the only 
explanations for the endurance of the disputes or the cycles of military assertion and 
diplomatic maneuvering vis-à-vis the South China Sea territories.   
This chapter also examines other two other potential factors in the disputes – 
China’s desire to establish hegemonic power in the region; and its desire to control the 
region’s natural resources.  The two explanations are intertwined, as China’s natural 
resource imports traverse the South China Sea.  Consequently, they ensure not only 
access to the region’s resources, but their safe arrival in China, Beijing must ensure the 
protection of its SLOCs.  However, in order to do this, China need not establish a firm 
hegemony in Southeast Asia.  Good diplomatic relations with its southern neighbors 
combined with a capable military capability in the South China Sea accomplish the same 
goals. 
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 
History shows few political or military clashes over these rocky formations until 
the 1970s.  Why the sudden increase in interest?  Some suggest that nascent nationalism 
sparked an Asian variant of Manifest Destiny in China and that Beijing plans to establish 
a Chinese hegemony in the South China Sea region, if not to re-establish historical 
political boundaries and influence, then at least in order to establish some semblance of 
security for increasingly critical sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and trade routes.  
Most subscribe to the theory that natural resources play the largest role, thereby 
explaining the coincidence of the first survey missions and discoveries with the increase 
in publicly announced claims, occupations, and ultimately the increase in diplomatic and 
8 
military tensions.  This chapter will examine all of these factors but begins with a look at 
the role that international law, in particular, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), plays in the South China Sea territorial disputes.   
Samuel S.G. Wu and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita state, “Three factors changed the 
previously disinterested behavior of countries bordering the South China Sea…(1) the 
islands’ strategic value…(2) the vast wealth of oil in the surrounding territorial waters; 
and (3) consideration of the [United Nations] Convention on the Law of the Sea.”8  The 
1982 UNCLOS gave claimants the initial perception that the territories were useful in 
expanding their political boundaries well beyond their current demarcation as well as 
guaranteeing ownership of the natural resources within these new boundaries.  The 
UNCLOS allows archipelagic states to draw straight baselines that join “the outmost 
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.”9  Inside of these 
baselines, which can extend up to 125 nautical miles between the island base points, lay 
the archipelagic state’s “internal waters.”10  This definition of archipelagic waters as 
internal makes the state sovereign over these waters as if they were a river or lake on a 
continental state, allowing the state authorities to suspend innocent passage for the 
“protection of its security.”11  However, the UNCLOS does not make it clear who can or 
cannot claim archipelagic status.  The state may, but is not obligated to, establish 
sea-lanes and air routes through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial 
sea.   
The nation’s territorial sea extends 12 NMI beyond the archipelagic baselines and 
the state can extend its exclusive economic rights up to 200 NMI beyond these, known as 
an economic exclusion zone (EEZ).12  Article 55 of the UNCLOS defines an EEZ as, 
“the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime 
established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the 
                                                 
8 Samuel S. G. Wu, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea: A 
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rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this 
Convention.”13  In the event that two or more parties claim the same area, the UNCLOS 
calls for peaceful dispute resolution using a variety of mechanisms ranging from 
self-arbitrated agreements between claimants to rulings by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).  The UNCLOS does not make it clear if a primarily continental nation, such 
as China, can claim archipelagic status.  It is likely that the ICJ would not sanction such a 
move as it would go beyond the 125 mile limit set by the UNCLOS.  Additionally, doing 
so would be tantamount to the United States claiming archipelagic status due to is 
political control of the Hawaiian Islands, thereby making a large portion of the Pacific 
Ocean U.S. internal waters.  This example potentially explains why the UNCLOS states a 
125 nmi range; however, the convention itself does not explain the logic behind this 
range, thereby allowing nations to continue claiming archipelagic status even when such 
claims fail the reasonable man test.  However, it appears that all of the claimants share 
this author’s perception that the ICJ would not rule favorably for any of them, 
particularly when the claims do exceed this 125 nmi limit.  No claimants have convinced 
the others to rescind their claims, nor have any garnered outside support from the major 
powers or international institutions. 
A possible example of the ICJ’s desire to remain out of the natural resource 
debate is its 17 December 2002 decision regarding the sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan 
and Pulau Sipadan, two small islands off the coast of Borneo that previously were also 
claimed by Indonesia and the Philippines. 14   The ICJ ruled in favor of Malaysia.  
However, while it is reasonable to infer from the UNCLOS that an ICJ decision regarding 
territorial disputes would include the region’s resources, the convention does not 
specifically state this is the case.  Consequently, the ICJ was free to decide only on the 
islands themselves, leaving the maritime boundary of the Celebes Sea’s hydrocarbon-rich 
region in dispute.15  The next year Indonesia and Malaysia temporarily shelved the 
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disputes by ending their gas and oil exploration activities in the offshore and deepwater 
sea beds but they have yet to agree that the matter should again be deferred to 
international adjudication. 16   This apparent dissatisfaction with the 2002 ICJ result 
undoubtedly contributes to the disputes throughout the South China Sea region remaining 
unresolved.   
However, despite this dissatisfaction, since the late-1990s, claimants have at least 
temporarily discontinued the sporadic practice of militarily asserting their claims.  The 
multiple territorial claims, and their associated military, economic, and political attempts 
to assert them, create an often confusing, sometimes even contradictory collection of 
events.  This thesis briefly examines the history of the claims and the actions taken by 
Beijing to assert them in order to discern any identifiable patterns of claimant behavior. 
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CLAIMS 
This section briefly examines the South China Sea territorial claims from the early 
20th century until present day.  This examination finds two potential trends.  The first 
occurs prior to 1995 and appears to link claimants’ announcements of resource 
exploration and extraction and military conflict in the region.  The second shows a 
possible linkage between diplomatic and economic agreements in the region. 
China and Taiwan both claim virtually the entire South China Sea region, though 
official announcements and documents lack reference to any coordinate system.  
Beijing’s and Taipei’s claims, hereafter collectively referred to as “Chinese claims,” are 
almost entirely based on “historical usage,” claiming that Chinese ship captains routinely 
traversed the South China Sea starting 2,000 years ago and established regular 
navigational routes during the Han dynasty (206-220 A.D.).17  Like the Chinese claims, 
Vietnamese claims to the Spratly Islands are also historical, based on visits and alleged 
administrative actions.  Ancient Vietnamese court documents from the King Le Thanh 
Tong regime (1460-1497) clearly indicate that the Vietnamese government considered 
both the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes to be Vietnamese territory.18  However, these 
                                                 
16 Central Intelligence Agency, “Malaysia – Transnational Issues – Disputes: International.” 
17 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South 
China Sea, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 20. 
18 Ibid., 30. 
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Vietnamese claims are as questionable as Chinese claims.  In reality, very little 
administrative activity occurred, and fishermen from several states, not just Vietnamese 
sea goers, used the islands for navigation points and occasional anchorages.19  More 
importantly, the UNCLOS does not recognize either historical claims or intermittent 
administration as a basis for making territorial claims.  Consequently, it is the modern 
history of the claims and assertions thereof, those activities occurring in the 20th and 21st 
centuries, that are the most relevant, particularly given the lack of action by other 
claimants until the late 1960s.  Consequently, this thesis limits its scope to the modern era. 
On 26 July 1933, the French formally annexed the Spratly Islands as an extension 
of their colonial holdings in what would later become modern Vietnam.  This move 
prompted strong diplomatic protest from the Kuomintang (KMT) government in China 
the same month, though the Chinese navy was in no shape to counter the move militarily 
and its army was busy fighting an insurgent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and an 
expanding Japanese occupation force.20  Beijing uses this interaction with the French 
government as evidence of its pre-WWII claim to the South China Sea territories.  There 
appear to be few, if any protests by the other South China Sea claimants, presumably 
because most of the current claimants did not exist as nation-states until the 1950s or later, 
and their colonial predecessors largely ignored these territories during their reign.  The 
Japanese occupation of the South China Sea region during WWII marks the first 
undeniable interruption of sovereignty over the islands for whomever, if indeed anyone 
legally held it prior to that war.  China, then still under the KMT, moved quickly to 
occupy Itu Aba Island in 1946, making it the first Asian power to take physical 
possession of any of the Spratly islands after the war ended, however, this move went 
largely unnoticed by the international community.21  The disputes settled down until 
1951, when under Chapter 2, Article 2(f) of the Treaty of Peace, Japan renounced, “all 
                                                 
19 Valencia, et. al., 30. 
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right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.”22  The Chinese 
claim that this renunciation proves the legitimacy of their historic claims, however, the 
treaty makes no mention of which, if any, nation should assert sovereignty over the 
Islands. 
 
Figure 2.   Spratly Islands Claims by Reef/Island23 
 
From the 1950s, PRC and ROC maps included the South China Sea region as 
Chinese territory while most other claimants ignored the territories.  However, while 
governments ignored the territories, one Philippine businessman, Tomas Cloma, claimed 
a portion of the Spratly Islands for himself.  According to Valencia, Cloma’s claim stems 
from res nullius, the legal concept that the original sovereign powers abandoned the 
islands, allowing him to “re-discover” and establish settlements on them in 1947.24  As 
this chapter will cover shortly, in 1978, Cloma ceded these islands, which he named 
“Kalaya’an” or “Freedomland” to the Philippine government. 
                                                 
22 UCLA Center for Asian Studies, “Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, CA, Sept. 8, 1951,” 
East Asian Studies Documents, Online: http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/peace1951.htm.  Accessed 
23 October 2005. 
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The 1960s were relatively quiet vis-à-vis the South China Sea territories with one 
notable exception.  During this decade, North Vietnamese officials abrogated Vietnamese 
claims to the Parcel and Spratly Islands to China, ostensibly in return for Chinese 
assistance against the South Vietnamese.25  The 1970s were significantly more eventful 
and North Vietnam’s abrogation played a key role in China’s justification of its military 
actions at the start of the decade.  In 1973, South Vietnam took control of five Spratly 
islands, only to lose the Paracels to the PRC a year later as the Chinese used the 
distraction of Vietnam’s ongoing civil war as an opportunity to grab these islands.  
However, after the PLA successfully seized the Paracels, government officials in both 
North and South Vietnam cried foul; the South claiming they had not relinquished their 
claims and the North arguing that in their weakened state, they had no choice and that 
such a move was temporarily required to secure the PRC as an ally during the war.26  
Vietnam bolstered its Spratly claims and established some semblance of military garrison 
at several formerly unoccupied features in the Spratly Islands group.27  The region 
quieted again until 1978, when Ferdinand Marcos’ presidential decree announced the 
Philippines claim to Kalaya’an, quite possibly in reaction to China’s forcible occupation 
of the Paracels in 1974.28  Beijing responded by increasing the number of territories it 
physically controlled in the region, taking six more features from Vietnam.  In 1979, 
Malaysia announced its claims in the Spratlys – twelve islands and features in the South 
China Sea region, six of which it occupies in some way, shape, or form, three occupied 
by other claimants, and three which remain unoccupied by anyone.29  Malaysia has yet to 
militarily clash with China over these territories and has only had military engagements 
with the Philippines.30
                                                 
25 Valencia, et al., 32-33.  They reference Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for 
Settlements 16 (ISIS, Malaysia, 1992): “Vice Minister Ung Van Khiem stated on June 15, 1956, to the 
Chinese Charge d’Affaires that ‘According to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha Islands are 
historically part of Chinese Territory’” and “A formal note from Pham Van Dong to Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai stated: ‘The  Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam recognizes and supports the 
declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s territorial sea made on 
September 4, 1958.’” 
26 Lu Ning, 24. 
27 Valencia, et. al., 31. 
28 Ibid.., 34. 




Time Diplomatic/Legal Military Actions/Conflict Economic 
1930s  France occupies Spratly islands  
1934-1944  Japan occupies Spratlys  
1946  KMT forces occupy Itu Aba   
1951 Japan renounces all rights to Spratly Islands   
1960 North Vietnam abrogates Paracels to PRC   
1973  S. Vietnam seizes 5 Spratlys  
1974  PRC seizes the Paracel Islands  
1978 Philippines extends claim to Kalaya’an PRC seizes 6 atolls from Vietnam  
1979 Malaysia makes its Spratly claims   
1982 Brunei claims exclusive fishing zone   
1988  
Vietnam adds 15 features to claim; 
PRC & Vietnam clash at Johnson 
Reef; PRC seizes 6 isles 
 
Feb 1992 PRC Territorial Sea Law   
May 1992   
Chinese exploration contract 
with Crestone, Vietnamese 
contract with Nopec 
Jul 1992 Claimants agree to peaceful resolution China occupies Da Lac Reef  
Sep 1992 
Hanoi claims PRC 
violates agreement not to 
drill in disputed waters 
 PRC drills on Vietnam side of Gulf of Tonkin line 
May 1993   Hanoi accuses PRC survey of interfering with BP 
1994 Brunei extends claim to 200 NMI EEZ 
PRC temporary blockade of 
VietSovpetro oil rig 
Vietnam-VietSovpetro 
contract, PRC-Exxon 
contract N. Natuna Gulf, 
Feb 1995  China seizes Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef  
Jan 1996  PRC & RP vessels clash near Capones Island  
Apr 1996   PetroVietnam & Conoco sign exploration deal 
Mar 1997 Hanoi protests PRC drilling in Gulf of Tonkin;  
PRC begins drilling within 
Vietnam's EEZ claim 
Dec 1997 Vietnam protests Chinese ships in Wan’an Bei 
Vietnamese navy escorts Chinese 
vessels from area  
May 1999  
RP warship sinks PRC fishing 
boat; PRC harasses grounded RP 
naval vessel 
 
Dec 2000 China & Vietnam resolve Wan’an Bei  dispute   
Dec 2001   ASEAN & China sign Free Trade Agreement 
Nov 2002 ARF & PRC sign Declaration on Conduct   
May 2005   Sino-Viet-Filipino Exploration Agreement 
 
Table 1. Chronology of Claims, Clashes, and Exploration in the South China Sea 
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 The 1980s ushered in another Spratlys claimant, Brunei, the only claimant of the 
six to avoid military conflict over the territories thus far.  The boundaries of Brunei’s 
1982 claim involve two reefs – Louisa Reef, also claimed by Malaysia, and Rifleman 
Bank – and exclusive fishing zone in their surrounding waters. 31   Brunei publicly 
published its claims in 1988 by publishing a map clearly demarcating Rifleman Bank and 
Louisa Reef as Brunei territory.32  Also in 1988, Chinese military actions against the 
South China Sea territories flared up again when Beijing and Vietnam clashed over 
Johnson Reef.  As former Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officer Lu Ning 
stated, “In the late 1980s, with Vietnam isolated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the U.S.-led embargo, China began to press home its power advantage, occupying seven 
features, and, in March 1988, attacking and defeating Vietnamese forces near Fiery Cross 
Reef.”33  By April 1988, Hanoi responded to the Chinese encroachment by expanding 
Vietnam’s claims, but not its occupied territories, to encompass an additional 15 Spratly 
features, while Beijing concurrently occupied another six.  From 1989 until 1992, the 
region calmed down again.  In fact, all of the claimants except China, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam signed the “Manila” accord, agreeing to peacefully resolve differences and 
“avoid unilateral actions that would jeopardize the process.”34  However, in 1992, the 
first series of political and economic battles began with Beijing’s passing of its “Law on 
Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas” in February of that year. 
In May 1992, China went beyond speeches and political statements and took 
action, letting a concession to the U.S. based Crestone Energy Corporation for the 
exploration of a 7,347 square-nautical mile area between the Vanguard Bank and the 
Prince of Wales Bank.35  This move sparked loud and critical responses from the other 
claimants and earned the title, “the most significant event [in the Spratlys]” from 
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Valencia, Van Dyke, and Ludwig.36  In the face of this negative press, Beijing again 
offered to negotiate the disputes and restated its assurances that it would not use force to 
assert its claims in the Spratlys.37  The response from the other claimants was less than 
enthusiastic.  In fact, Vietnam established a contract with the Norwegian company, 
Nopec, to conduct surveys in areas overlapping the Chinese concession to Crestone.38  In 
July 1992, the Vietnamese also accused China of occupying Da Lac Reef, the feature 
nearest to the Crestone concession area.39  China and Vietnam continued to periodically 
clash in the early 1990s.  In 1992, Hanoi accused China of drilling on what it claims is 
the Vietnamese side of the Gulf of Tonkin line and in 1993, alleged a Chinese survey 
vessel interfered with work by British Petroleum conducted under a contract with 
Vietnam.40  In 1994, Vietnam hired VietSovpetro to drill in the area that the PRC 
contracted to Crestone, undoubtedly adding to Beijing’s irritation with the Vietnamese 
and spurring a brief Chinese blockade of the VietSovpetro drilling rig.41  However, the 
1992 capture of Da Lac marks China’s last forcible occupation of territory in the South 
China Sea already occupied by claimants.   
After this latest Chinese clash with Vietnam in 1992, Beijing began attempts to 
quietly exploit features already under Chinese control, while at the same time covertly 
attempting to establish a presence on other, uninhabited and largely ignored features.  
One such endeavor was a contract with Exxon to explore the region just north of the 
Natuna Gulf, a region this chapter discusses shortly.  Another effort is the now infamous 
occupation of Philippine claimed Mischief Reef.  Presumably, Beijing interpreted the  
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37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 31. 
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inattention by other claimants as an indication that the features were of little interest to 
them and presumably felt that Chinese actions would go at best unnoticed or at worst fail 
to spark a reaction from the other claimants. 
However, at the foreign ministers’ meeting in March 1995, the ASEAN foreign 
ministers issued a statement expressing their collective “serious concern over recent 
developments, which affect peace and stability in the South China Sea.”42  The statement 
does not clearly identify Chinese actions but it set the stage for discussions during the 
second ARF meeting where members added the South China Sea disputes to the agenda 
despite Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan’s vehement objections.43
This turn of events aggravated Wang enough to hold a press conference to 
publicly protest the ARF’s “interference in China’s sovereign affairs,” while the rest of 
the delegates debated the specific wording of the ARF statement. 44  Additionally, an 
Indonesian participant characterized the interaction between senior ARF members and 
Beijing as, “direct and quite unsettling to the Chinese.”45  While the 18 March 1995 
statement and the chairman’s statement from the second ARF meeting later that August46 
did not contain the stern language desired by Manila, they still mark the first instance of 
ASEAN members collectively voicing their concerns to China regarding the resolution of 
the South China Sea disputes. 
Because of its growing military and economy, China had the capability to attempt 
coercing each claimant individually but not all at once, particularly considering the close 
ties of between the United States and some of the ASEAN members.  China appears to 
have shifted tactics and the ASEAN nations responded to Beijing’s diplomatic and 
economic overtures by offering a cautious yet peaceful acceptance, particularly since 
Beijing appeared to have limited its military actions in the South China Sea since 1996 
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primarily to training exercises north of the Paracel Islands, a perception that continues 
today.  Since 1996, all Chinese involvement in South China Sea clashes but one, 
mentioned later in this chapter, involve private vessels and fishing boats, not PLAN 
warships.47   
However, Mischief Reef was not the only Chinese action that raised alarm in the 
region in the mid-1990s.  Beijing also published maps clearly indicating that Chinese 
claims included Indonesia’s EEZ claim in the previously mentioned Natuna Gulf.  One 
can imagine Jakarta’s discomfort when the Chinese signed a contract with Exxon in 1994 
to explore the northern Natuna Gulf.  Interest in the area is understandable; it is the only 
proven resource field in the South China Sea region.  Indonesia pumps 35,000 barrels of 
oil per day from its EEZ and estimates suggest there is at least 210 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas in the northern part of the Natuna island chain, possibly the largest 
concentration of gas reserves in the world.48  Despite some claims to the contrary, China 
has not approached its South China Sea claims incrementally – publishing new maps with 
“gradually expanding boundaries,” then acting to validate them. 49   As previously 
discussed, since at least the early 1950s, Beijing has insisted the South China Sea is a 
Chinese lake.  However, Indonesia still claims that previously published maps did not 
show Chinese claims protruding into Indonesian claimed territory and that the 1995 maps 
do.50  Dispute the cartographical spats between China and Indonesia, the two nations 
have never had any military clashes over their disputed territories and despite the lack of 
resolution, their diplomats and leaders maintain a functional working relationship.   
Relations between China and the Republic of the Philippines have been another 
story and the 1999 Sino-Philippine clashes added to the already tense situation in the 
South China Sea.  Early in the year, a Philippine naval vessel collided with and sunk a 
Chinese fishing boat.51  A few weeks later, Manila reported that a PLAN ship “harassed” 
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a Philippine naval vessel that accidentally became grounded near the Spratlys.52  The 
construction of a landing strip at Woody Island in the 1990s,53 the improved capabilities 
of PLAN vessels, successful refueling and resupply exercises conducted underway in the 
summer of 2005, and the uncertain status of China’s aircraft carrier program, appear to 
add credence to fears that Beijing may be planning a move on the resources in the Natuna 
Gulf.54  China’s new Su-30 FLANKER aircraft have a flight range of 1270 km when 
traveling at sea level, and even further at higher altitudes, making China’s Natuna claims, 
located only 150 nmi NW of Borneo, within striking range from the Woody Island 
airstrip.55  However, after 1999, the disputes calmed down considerably with China 
peacefully resolving the Wan’an Bei dispute with Vietnam in 2000, and signing two 
agreements with ASEAN – the Sino-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2002, and the 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with the ARF in 2002.  It 
appears that the year 2005 was a busy one for China as well.   
In November 2004, President Arroyo signed an agreement with China and 
Vietnam for a three-year seismic study of the Spratly Islands region.56  Beijing and 
Manila reported that the seismic survey work, completed on 19 November 2005, was 
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Company (PNOC) Exploration Corporation, to state, “[the] Political tensions surrounding 
the South China Sea in the 1990s are history” and that the current multilateral approach is 
truly a “win-win” situation.57
However, as the South China Sea appears to possibly be winding down, the East 
China Sea looked troublesome, albeit temporarily.  Beijing faces another longstanding 
territorial dispute with Japan as both nations claim the Senkaku or Diaoyu (钓鱼) Islands, 
the Japanese and Chinese names respectively.  The situation in the East China Sea heated 
up in 2005 as China and Japan began drilling near the Senkaku Islands, claimed by both 
Tokyo and Beijing.  China responded to the Japanese drilling announcement by 
dispatching PLAN ships to the area “on a routine exercise” and releasing foreign ministry 
statement, “China has set up a reserve vessel squadron…in [the] East China Sea.  The 
fleet is aimed to promote the capacities of [the] Chinese Navy on emergency handling, 
urgent mobilization, speedy grouping, maritime support and malfunction-resolving.”58   
While China has sent patrols through the South China Sea for ostensibly the same 
reasons, the navies in South East Asia are less of a threat to the PLAN than the Japanese 
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF).  Japanese forces are perceived to be the best 
equipped and trained sailors in the Asia-Pacific, with Christopher Twomey stating, “an 
adversary’s navy entering Japanese waters would suffer dearly, and all but the most 
capable navies would find themselves outgunned anywhere in the Western Pacific.”59  
However, despite this overwhelming naval capability, the Japanese have since agreed, at 
least in principle, to joint development, though the details of such a combined endeavor 
are still under negotiations.60   
While the situation in the East China Sea appears to be at least temporarily 
calming down, China’s actions could indicate a perception in Beijing that oil and gas 
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deposits are potentially worth ratcheting up military tensions, even against a modern and 
highly capable force such as the JMSDF.  This chapter endeavors to demonstrate the 
validity of this assertion later.  Such a perception may also explain Manila’s shift from 
one of the loudest critics of Chinese actions in the region to one of the first claimants to 
share the responsibilities and benefits of the South China Sea with Beijing, though this 
thesis limits its investigation primarily to Chinese perceptions and actions, leaving the 
other claimants for future researchers.   
As previously stated, the South China Sea territorial disputes are difficult to 
follow as claimants use a chaotic combination of legal, political, military, and economic 
means to assert their claims.  As Table 1 illustrated earlier in this chapter, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, there is an apparent pattern of political and legal claims, followed by military 
actions to assert them, and limited claimant reactions, both diplomatic and military.  The 
primary military players are, unsurprisingly, the two claimants with the most military 
power in the region at that time, China and Vietnam.   
In the 1990s however, the economic factor enters and see a pattern of contract 
signing and exploration, followed by military actions, and finally diplomacy.  In the first 
half of 1992, China and Vietnam signed exploration contracts, the PRC with the U.S. 
firm, Crestone and Vietnam with the European firm, Nopec.  In July, while the rest of the 
claimants signed the “Manila Agreement” to resolve the disputes peacefully, China 
forcibly occupied Da Lac Reef.  In September, China began drilling on what Vietnam 
claimed was its side of the “Gulf of Tonkin line,” a demarcation not agreed to by Beijing.  
After diplomatic protests from Hanoi, China ended its drilling, though it is uncertain 
whether this was due to the protests or simply because they completed their planned work.  
While one can perceive Beijing’s actions as hostile, it is unreasonable to completely 
discount the Vietnamese contract with Nopec as a potential catalyst for Chinese behavior.  
Additionally, the exploration and exploitation work by VietSovpetro under a contract 
with Hanoi in 1994 may have sparked the temporary Chinese blockade of the Vietnamese 
platform.  It is logical to conclude that Beijing perceived this move at least as a threat to 
China’s interests and at worst as a clear example that Vietnam was “stealing” Chinese 
resources. 
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For the first half of the decade 2000, there have been two large economic deals – 
the Sino-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement on seismic data 
acquisition between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines – and two diplomatic 
progressions – the peaceful settlement of the Wan’an Bei dispute and the Sino-ARF 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”  In December 2000, 
Beijing and Hanoi peaceful resolved the Wan’an Bei dispute and a year later, ASEAN 
signed a Free Trade Agreement with China.  This could be a coincidence but no evidence 
clearly discounts the possibility that Hanoi somehow linked Vietnamese support of the 
Sino-ASEAN FTA to a peaceful territorial settlement.  Additionally, without the 2002 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” Vietnam, and the 
Philippines would ostensibly be less likely to draft a tripartite exploration agreement with 
China, let alone execute such an agreement. 
The question remains, what drives these disputes and the attempts to settle or 
prolong them?  This chapter now examines two explanations behind the disputes’ 
longevity and the claimants’ actions and reactions – that there is a Chinese desire to 
establish hegemony in the region; and that the region’s natural resources are driving a 
land/sea grab. 
D. A NEW CHINESE HEGEMONY? – CHINA’S GROWING POWER 
VIS-À-VIS ITS SOUTHEAST ASIAN NEIGHBORS 
China is putting forth great efforts to become a regional leader, attempting 
to regain a preeminence not seen since the middle of the 19th century 
before Western powers and Japan took advantage of a weakening China to 
colonize its "Middle Kingdom" system.61
Proponents of the “China threat” theory argue that one of the reasons behind 
China’s claims to the South China Sea territories is Beijing’s desire to reestablish the 
power and political dominance experienced by China’s ancient dynasties.  These pundits 
are particularly critical of China’s seizure of Mischief Reef, noting that this and the 
recently upgraded airfield at Woody Island62 potentially allow the PLAN to “dominate 
the sea lanes out to the first island chain” and are a precursor to an alteration of the 
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PLAAF’s primarily defensive role to “attack readiness.”63  This hawkish view alleges 
that Beijing looks to the South China Sea territories to boost the PLA’s capability to, 
“strike not only at shipping, but at all the countries that surround the South China Sea, 
including such U.S. allies as the Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand.”64  This view is 
absurd if for no other reason than the fact that none of the Spratly Islands are suitable to 
use as a base of operations.   
Additionally, as the examination of trade between China, ASEAN, and the United 
States in Chapter III will show, such a view simply does not coincide with reality.  
Beijing depends on trading partners to purchase Chinese exports at a continually 
increasing rate.  Additionally, even if Beijing’s initial plans were to continue seizing 
territories through military action, the military modernization programs that the ASEAN 
nations embarked on in the 1990s65 combined with the restoration of a noteworthy U.S. 
military presence after September 2001 effectively check any Chinese military 
adventurism in the region.  Valencia’s statement in 1999 still holds true today, 
[The] results for the Chinese could be disastrous if they came up against a 
force armed with even a small number of “smart” weapons.  Such a 
situation is almost certainly unavoidable since China’s regional rivals are 
growing in both wealth and technological prowess…China is too 
calculating and preoccupied with domestic economic development to 
divert resources to such a regional conflict.66
As the next section will discuss in more detail, an unsubstantiated amount of 
natural resources remain embedded beneath the region’s floor.  However, as Valencia 
states, “Oil…is just one factor in the Spratly dispute.  The islands are also considered 
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strategic bases for sea-lane defence, interdiction and surveillance.”67  Beijing has made 
its perception that the Spratly and Paracel Islands bear a high strategic value widely 
known in a 1975 edition of the Chinese newspaper Guangmingribao (光明日報), 
As it lies between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, the South China Sea is 
a vital strategic area.  It acts as a gateway to the outside world for the 
mainland and offshore islands of China.  The [Paracel and Spratly] 
archipelagoes occupy a position central to the shipping lands connecting 
Canton, Hong Kong, Manila and Singapore.  [Hence] their geographic 
position is extremely significant.”68
While in all likelihood, this serves to further explain China’s seizure of the 
Parcels from Vietnam it may also have been a warning to other claimants not to pursue 
their competing claims.  However, as early as 1974, China did over U.S.$600 million of 
trade with Southeast Asia and U.S.$1 billion with the United States and most of this 
traversed the South China Sea.69  As the next section will discuss, Beijing views the 
South China Sea as the primary conduit for its oil imports and these same shipping lanes 
carry the bulk of China’s trade with the Middle East and Europe as well.   
In addition to protecting China’s economic interests, establishing maintainable 
sovereignty over the South China Sea region would improve China’s military security, at 
a minimum allowing for earlier detection of incoming maritime and airborne threats.  
Failing that, China will likely invoke a right to freedom of navigation and increase its 
patrol of the waters, a function that the destroyers and submarines Beijing is purchasing 
are particularly well suited. 
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Figure 3.   China’s Critical Sea Lines of Communication70 
 
The security of Chinese SLOCs also plays a key role in Beijing’s approach to the 
South China Sea disputes.  As Chaper III will discuss, a large portion of China’s trade is 
with, and travels through, Southeast Asia and a reasonable assertion could be that the 
PLAN modernization and expansion are an attempt to project Chinese power into this 
region in order to protect these trade routes.  However, while the economic portion of the 
argument is undeniable, the latter portion is less concrete when one considers the Taiwan 
factor.  Any arguments stating that Chinese military reform and modernization focuses on 
the South China Sea are equally applicable to the Taiwan Straits.  Considering the 
virtually shelving of the Chinese aircraft carrier program, most of the recent PLAN 
acquisitions – DDGs, SSNs, and patrol boats – are currently more effective in the brown 
and green waters of the Taiwan Straits than in the South China Sea’s blue waters.71
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While not completely disproving the argument that China continues the territorial 
disputes because of a desire to establish a regional hegemony, this section does 
demonstrate that the argument is hardly ironclad.  The protection of Chinese SLOCs does 
not require absolute sovereignty in the region and, as Chapter III will discuss, runs 
counter to the Chinese change in approach towards more diplomatic resolutions.  
Consequently, this thesis examines another possible cause, that the potential natural 
resources in the South China Sea drive China’s continued claims of regional sovereignty. 
E. ARE NATURAL RESOURCES DRIVING A “LAND/SEA GRAB” IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA? 
The 2005 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the PRC stated, 
“As China’s economy grows, its desire for markets and natural resources (e.g. metals and 
fossil fuels) will influence China’s strategic behavior.”72   In 2004, China imported 
88 percent of its oil from the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific and all of this 
traversed the Malacca Strait to get to China.73  Ninety-five percent of China’s oil imports 
arrive by sea, most coming through the Malacca Strait, making this waterway so 
important to Chinese leaders that they refer to it as, “China’s seaborne oil lifeline.”74
In July of this year, Zhang Lijun, a researcher with the China Institute of 
International Studies, wrote in Beijing Review, “Energy security has become one of the 
focuses of China's diplomacy, with the aim to end competition on energy issues with 
neighboring countries and find ways to cooperate with them.” 75   The March 2005 
Agreement on Tripartite Marine Seismic Work between Beijing, Hanoi, and Manila, 
briefly discussed earlier in this chapter, provides further evidence of this approach.76  
Beijing appears willing to forgo resolving sovereignty of the disputed South China Sea 
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claims in order to gain increased access to the region’s energy reserves.77  Otherwise, 
China would not have signed the agreement on the trilateral exploration work, let alone 
cooperated with its execution.  Zhu Weilin, vice-president of China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC), stated at the conclusion of the initial tripartite work in November 
2005, “Mutual respect and trust between the three countries guaranteed the milestone 
development of joint exploration in the South China Sea.”78  The reason behind Beijing’s 
cooperative attitude is simple.  China is continually modernizing and the rapidly 
increasing industrial nature of the nation’s industries necessitates an equally rapidly 
growing need for energy.   
In the 1980s, China was East Asia’s largest petroleum exporter; today it accounts 
for more than 30 percent of the world’s growth in oil demand and is the second-largest oil 
importer.79  Some estimates claim that unless China finds new oil reserves within its 
existing territories, by 2020 Beijing will have to import approximately 100 million tons 
of oil per year to meet the nation’s petroleum requirements.80
As Figure 4 shows, even by conservative accounts China’s energy requirements 
will fast outgrow its domestic capacity.  As previously stated, China is already the 
world’s second largest petroleum exporter, with the United States as number one.  By the 
year 2025, China’s daily energy consumption will be at least 12 million barrels.81  To 
meet the demand that China’s growing energy consumption entails, Beijing must either 
find an alternative fuel source, a task confounding even the United States, or find other 
sources of petroleum.  The South China Sea is one possible answer to this dilemma. 
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Figure 4.   China’s Energy Consumption82 
 
One of the more conservative Chinese projections of South China Sea oil reserves 
in the Spratly and Paracel Islands is over 100 billion barrels.83  Other estimates from 
Beijing for the region are as high as 225 billion barrels of oil.84  If Beijing could gain 
access to the resources today, and somehow hold consumption at the 2004 rate (6 million 
barrels per day), even using the using the low end Chinese estimate of the region’s 
holdings (100 billion barrels) the region would provide China with petroleum for over a 
century.  Using this same low end estimate of the amount of petroleum and the high end 
consumption estimate for 2025 (16 million barrels per day), the region would still meet 
China’s 2025 energy needs for over 17 years.  Considering the constant media predictions 
of a dwindling world oil supply, it is surprising that the military assertions have not 
continued.  Chapter III explores some of the reasons for the shift in China’s approach to 
the disputes, from military action to diplomacy. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Beijing, Taipei, and Hanoi include historical documents and archeological 
exhibits as part of the evidence supporting their South China Sea territorial claims and all 
of the claimants invoke questionably legitimate applications of international law 
regarding archipelagoes, abandonment and “re-discovery.”  As a result, the disputes will 
remain hotly contested and unresolved until one or more claimants offers acceptable 
compromises.  The reasons behind the territorial disputes involve nationalism, energy, 
economics, and security.  A study of the clashes and their causes reveals no single 
instigator.  However, what is clear is that, until the late 1990s, announcements of pending 
survey and drilling activities, and the subsequent execution of these plans triggered 
diplomatic and military responses from all of the claimants, particularly China and 
Vietnam.  It is also a reasonable assertion that Beijing places a high strategic value of its 
SLOCs and may be willing to protect them with its increasing military power when 
necessary, as evidenced by the continued modernization of the PLAN and the 
establishment of a maritime reserve fleet in the East China Sea.  However, the 
continuation of maritime trade through the region and the promise of access to its natural 
resources are goals that, so far, Beijing can obtain without using force.  In fact, as the 
next chapter will demonstrate, China stands to gain more by not using its increasing 
military capabilities to settle the South China Sea territorial disputes.  Consequently, the 
acceptance of the 2002 Sino-ASEAN “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea” is a step towards ensuring the continuation of favorable economic and 




III. EXPLANATIONS FOR RECENT SHIFTS IN CHINESE 
POLICY VIS-À-VIS THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recent shifts in China’s South China Sea policy include a decrease in offensive 
military actions and an increase in its use of diplomacy in the region.  This chapter briefly 
examines both of these shifts in an attempt to determine what, if any, causal explanations 
exist.  The thesis presents three explanations – the effects of international diplomacy; 
shifts in the Chinese perceptions of themselves, their nation, and the international 
environment and actors; and finally, the impact that using the PLA offensively has on 
China’s trade.  This chapter looks at each of these explanations to determine which, if 
any, help explain the shift in China’s approach to the South China Sea territorial disputes. 
B. TRENDS IN CHINA’S APPROACHES TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
SINCE THE 1990S 
China specialists and U.S. policy makers have noted trends in PRC behavior, both 
in general and towards the South China Sea territorial disputes specifically, though since 
the year 2000, publications are considerably fewer regarding the latter.  One clearly 
demonstrated trend is the virtual absence of Chinese military actions, blatant or covert, to 
acquire new territories in the South China Sea region since its occupation of Philippine 
claimed Mischief Reef in 1995.  In the late 1990s, Beijing significantly increased its 
engagement with international institutions and diplomacy.  It’s “charm offensive” 
preceding and especially during the 1996-97 Asian Financial Crisis is still paying 
dividends today. 
1. Decrease in Chinese Offensive Military Actions in the South China 
Sea 
The last Chinese offensive actions to seize territory already occupied by another 
claimant were against Vietnam in 1992.  While Chinese construction efforts on Mischief 
Reef enraged the Philippines and increased the suspicions of Southeast Asian and 
Western governments, the PLAN took control of the island without firing a shot and the 
Philippine government remained unaware of the Chinese presence until construction was 
well underway.  Moreover, as previously mentioned in Chapter II, since the 1995 
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Mischief Reef incident, all but one of the Sino-Philippine clashes involved Philippine 
vessels engaging Chinese ships, not the other way around, suggesting a Chinese lack of 
aggression in the latter half of the 1990s, though the Philippine government claims their 
mere presence in disputed waters is an aggressive act.  The one exception involved 
Chinese ships “harassing” a grounded Philippine navy vessel in March 1999.  However, 
this incident occurred only a few days after a Philippine warship collided with and sunk a 
Chinese fishing boat.85   
One reason for this decrease in military actions is Beijing’s largely successful 
attempts to depoliticize the PLA, thereby greatly decreasing its role in policy 
decision-making compared to previous regimes.  Since 1997, the overall size of the PLA 
has dramatically decreased, cutting over 400,000 personnel.  Concurrently, the ships and 
aircraft of the PLAN and PLAAF have increased in quantity and capabilities.  However, 
military activities outside of training and research and development are virtually 
nonexistent, particularly in the South China Sea region.  China has shifted from 
continental defense to maritime defense “to account for future regional contingencies.”86  
While this could mean that the stakes of military conflict with the PLAN are higher, the 
professionalism of the PLA and the increased use of diplomacy by Beijing indicate that 
the risks of such conflict are indeed much lower. 
a. The Rise and Fall of the PLA’s Political Influence 
The revolutionary nature of the PRC’s creation necessitated the massive 
involvement of PLA officers in the Chinese government, comprising a majority of the 
Chinese Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee in the early years.  The divisive 
effects of Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution further compounded this 
phenomenon, allowing the PLA a continued presence and role in Chinese policy 
decisions.   
The make-up of China’s bureaucracy and individual actor preferences 
appear to have a role to play in both the Chinese decision making process and its 
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subsequent results.  From the PRC’s inception through today, the PLA plays a role in 
government.  In 1992, John Garver argued that high-ranking PLAN officers had a direct 
effect on what policies Beijing pursued as the Chinese navy fought for its piece of a 
shrinking budget during the 1970s and 1980s.87  Garver points to the PLAN buildup 
during this period as evidence.  In 1999, Ian Storey pursued Garver’s argument regarding 
the role of the PLA in China’s South China Sea policy, using Jiang Zemin’s ascension to 
the “core” of China’s leadership as evidence. 88   Storey argues that without Deng 
Xiaoping’s support, Jiang reached out to the PLA leadership to consolidate his hold on 
central power.  The argument continues that the price of PLA support was a “more 
assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States, [and] the South China Sea.” 89   
Additionally, he updates Garver’s 1992 work, arguing that since 1997, having solidified 
his leadership role, Jiang dramatically reduced the PLA’s role in Chinese policymaking.90
Indeed, Jiang Zemin continued Deng Xiaoping’s work to significantly 
reduce the PLA’s role in governance while adding funding for the build up that Storey 
and Garver use as evidence to support their domestic bureaucracy argument.  In contrast 
to some who might predict a strong political role for the PLAN under Hu, today the entire 
military is playing less of a role in Chinese politics and policy decision making.91   
Currently, the only military officers serving in the Politburo are two PLA ground officers, 
both with experience as political training officers and experience in the interior Chinese 
territories.  China’s behavior no longer fits its previous patterns as the PLA takes a back 
seat to the civilian dominant central government.   
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Mulvenon’s summation of the role of China’s military leaders today 
supports this view: “The PLA’s institutional and personal channels of influence 
decline…the institution continues to withdraw from non-defense-related interests to focus 
almost exclusively in military affairs and only the more core foreign policy issues.”92  
Consequently, it is reasonable to allow that the Hu administration’s deviation from the 
expected behaviors presented by Garver, Storey, and Heginbotham decreases the ability 
of their bureaucratic interaction theory to accurately predict Chinese behavior. 
Additionally, the civilian leadership’s reliance on military support leading 
up to and during leadership transitions appears to be no longer necessary.  The peaceful 
Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao transition further shows the bureaucratic power of PLA and 
PLAN leaders continues to decrease as their involvement in policy decisions becomes 
increasingly institutionalized.  The current Chinese leadership, dubbed the “fourth 
generation,” finds strength in this institutionalization of Chinese policy making and 
thereby likely no longer sees the need to curry favor among the nation’s military 
leadership.  Consequently, the current crop of civilian leaders is free to explore other 
methods of pursuing China’s national interests.  One of the key elements allowing 
China’s fourth generation to modify its approach to policy decision making is the 
professionalization of the PLAN. 
b. PLAN Modernization and the South China Sea 
While the PLAN’s political influence is at least less formal than before, its 
role in defending Chinese territory and interests remains important.  As previously stated, 
Beijing’s acquisition and production of modern warships is increasing the Chinese 
maritime military capabilities.  However, as Chapter II showed, the aggressive Chinese 
activities of the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, are significantly fewer in the 21st century.  
Beijing acknowledges its massive buildup of maritime vessels but argues they are to 
upgrade Chinese capabilities to carry out “effective supervision in contiguous areas and 
exclusive economic zones” under the auspices of the Maritime Safety Administration of 
China's Ministry of Communications and are intended to improve “its maritime safety 
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supervision capability.”93  Some argue that Chinese military aggression in the South 
China Sea has decreased due to a lack of capability and that the military modernization 
efforts of Southeast Asian governments compound this problem.  China’s efforts to 
increase its South Sea Fleet appear to support these arguments, particularly the increased 
number of destroyers, frigates, and submarines, purchased from Russia as well as 
indigenously designed and manufactured.  However, the key capital ship to support 
theories of a Chinese desire for power projection, the aircraft carrier, remains absent and 
does so for several reasons. 
The costs associated with the design, building, manning and fielding of an 
aircraft carrier are staggering.  Additionally, for an aircraft carrier to be effective, most 
naval officers and analysts believe that the PLAN must possess and be proficient in 
complementary capabilities, such as combined fleet operations and off-shore patrolling, 
both difficult to exercise and master.  Activities such as the Sino-Russian “Peace Mission 
2005” exercise could provide the PLA, PLAAF and PLAN opportunities to do precisely 
that.  The most recent Jane’s Defence Weekly article regarding Chinese aircraft carrier 
development provides images of the former Russian Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag, 
anchored at the Dalian shipyard since 2000.  The images show work underway, most 
noticeably a new PLAN color scheme and markings rather than the Russian markings and 
colors the Varyag held upon its arrival at Dalian.94  This appears to discredit Beijing’s 
original claims that the carrier would become a floating casino and will undoubtedly 
cause concern in East and Southeast Asia.  However, an interview with a U.S. Attaché to 
Beijing revealed that PLAN officers and the majority of the Chinese people want China 
to get an aircraft carrier but when asked why they answer it is for the purpose of national 
prestige.  The officer further posited that a cargo ship equipped with helicopter launching 
and recovery capability might suffice for national pride.  Additionally, when pressed, mid 
and staff level PLAN officers sheepishly reveal that the carrier’s purpose would be “to 
sail from port to port,” not to project power into the region.95
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Despite this, the PLAN forces are arguably more capable of militarily 
asserting China’s claims now than ever before.  However, there have been no military 
clashes between China and the other South China Sea claimants.  What explains this 
change?  The PLAN leadership, now removed from China’s polity lacks a direct role in 
Chinese foreign policy decision making.  Additionally, as Chapter III will examine in 
more detail, the Hu regime appears to continue a policy of peaceful diplomacy in lieu of 
direct military actions to pursue Chinese interests.  The next section of this chapter 
briefly portrays the Beijing’s increasing use of this diplomacy to address its challenges in 
the South China Sea region and the world. 
2. Increase in Diplomatic Efforts 
The Chinese appear to be learning from other nations’ experiences how to speak 
softly while carrying, or at least developing, a large stick.  Chinese leaders are 
increasingly optimistic that they will be able to continue operating in a peaceful external 
environment but realize they cannot afford any major disruptions in trade.  Consequently, 
China’s growing fleet serves to hedge bets in case multilateral diplomacy and economic 
interdependence fail to deliver continued, and as Beijing hopes, increased access to South 
China Sea trade routes and natural resources.  However, more importantly, it appears that 
Beijing is learning the importance of national reputation in diplomacy and how increasing 
involvement in regional institutions can dramatically improve Southeast Asian 
perceptions of China while costing the regime very little. 
A compilation of data from the Yearbook of International Organizations reveals a 
significant increase in China’s participation in international organizations in the late 
1990s.  Prior to the 1990s, China’s participation rate was well below that of comparably 
developed nations.  This was most likely due to Beijing’s perception that these 
institutions were merely back drops for great power politics.  China regarded 
international institutions as “subject to manipulation by the United States.”.96  However, 
as Figure 1 shows below, during the eight-year period from 1989 to 1997, the number of 
Chinese international organizational memberships nearly doubled from just over 30 to 
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over 50.97  In his 2003 article “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” Alastair Iain Johnston 
statistically examined membership in international organizations, developing a 
mathematical methodology to predict membership as related to a nation’s state of 
development.  While it slightly decreased from 1997 to 2000, China’s formal 
involvement in international organizations remains higher than Johnston’s predictions 
indicate it should be on the basis of its economic development.  This strongly suggests 






























Figure 5.   PRC International Organization Membership.98 
 
In March 2005, the U.S. State Department assessment of China stated, “Its 
[Beijing’s] moves to play a greater regional leadership role in Asia and, especially, the 
success of its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia are examples of a new, more mature 
diplomacy that China has begun to evince.”99  A key event leading up to this perception 
of a more diplomatically mature China is its acceptance of ASEAN’s demand for 
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multilateral negotiations, specifically when dealing with the South China Sea territorial 
disputes.  On 4 November 2002, China signed a multilateral “Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN, breaking Beijing’s long-standing 
demand to limit territorial disputes to bilateral talks.  The document fell short of the more 
legalistic code of conduct originally called for by the Philippines.  Manila wished for a 
clear ban and building up existing territorial holdings, such as Mischief Reef, but Beijing 
appears to have successfully lobbied the other ARF members to eliminate this language.  
On the other hand, the declaration is the first multilateral agreement signed by China 
prohibiting the seizure of additional territories in the South China Sea.   
The 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” is a 
non-binding document stating that the signatories,  
Undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through 
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly 
concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of 
international law…[and] exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities 
that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability 
including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the 
presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to 
handle their differences in a constructive manner.100
While Beijing has adhered to similar guidelines, such as the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, in its bilateral agreements, this is the first multilateral agreement 
between China and Southeast Asia.  Additionally, while not clearly establishing 
consequences for defection, there are now unmistakable reputational costs for doing so.  
Consequently, Beijing has allowed ASEAN to tie China’s hands, limiting Chinese 
expansion in the region at a time when the PLAN and PLAAF modernization, coupled 
with improved training, make military options more viable for Beijing than they were in 
the early 1990s.  Additionally, as this thesis discussed in Chapter II, China’s growing 
energy requirements potentially increase its desire to make the South China Sea region a 
“Chinese lake.”  Despite this, Beijing appears to be limiting itself to a soft power  
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approach, befuddling realists, delighting institutionalists, and allowing debates to 
continue for the foreseeable future regarding the true nature of China’s grand strategy and 
what end state the nation’s transformation will produce. 
There are several explanations from current international relations theory one can 
reference to explain this shift in the Chinese South China Sea policy and diplomatic 
warming more generally. 
C. REASONS FOR BEIJING’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE 2002 
DECLARATION ON CONDUCT 
This chapter now examines three explanations for China’s acceptance of the 2002 
ARF declaration – the effects of international diplomacy on Chinese decision making; 
shifts in the perceptions of Chinese leadership; and, the effects of China’s use of military 
force on its international trade. 
1. Effects of International Diplomacy 
Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel correctly, although somewhat ominously 
state, “As China becomes more engaged, it is also growing more adept at using its 
foreign policy relations to serve Chinese interests.  Today’s China is certainly smarter 
and more sophisticated – but not necessarily kinder or gentler.”101  China clearly attempts 
to influence the foreign policies of other actors in the international system, but foreign 
policy interactions also affect China.  As China opened up, its leadership and diplomatic 
corps appears to being to understand the intricacy and complexity of the international 
system.  The clear-cut “us versus them” mentality of the ideological Maoist era no longer 
sufficiently serves Chinese decision-making.  Instead, Beijing has to understand what 
drives other nation’s policy decisions and how they interpret, or misinterpret, Chinese 
signaling. 
By the late 1990s, Beijing seems to have learned both the adverse diplomatic 
effects and the potential economic repercussions of military aggression and coercion and 
consequently, Chinese leaders sheathed the PLAN in 1999.  As Avery Goldstein wrote 
earlier this year, “Although a modernizing China was impressively increasing its 
capabilities during the 1990s, greater capabilities did not seem to be enhancing the 
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country’s security because others were reacting with alarm to what China believed were 
simply efforts to ensure its own interests.” 102   Additional evidence that China’s 
diplomatic approach is evolving is a pattern of “fundamental compromises that China has 
chosen to make in limiting its own sovereign interests for the sake of engagement in 
multilateral frameworks and pursuit of greater regional interdependence.”103  Today’s 
Chinese leaders pursue the same general national interests as their predecessors, but their 
more nuanced use of diplomacy appears to be noticeably more effective that the 
occasionally ham-handed and contradictory practices of the Mao, Deng, and Jiang 
regimes.  One of these compromises is China’s acceptance of and increased involvement 
in multilateral institutions. 
Between 1997 and 2001, Chinese leaders who initially perceived multilateral 
institutions to be puppets of the United States had, through firsthand experience realized 
that, “Washington tended to dismiss or ignore them.” 104   Consequently, Beijing’s 
perception of ASEAN shifted from a threat that China must remove, or at least counter, 
to a potential regional ally.  Thus in 2002, the Beijing grasped an opportunity to mold the 
Southeast Asian region into one supportive of Chinese national interests.  After the end of 
the Cold War, Beijing appears to have recognized that these institutions were not merely 
stages for superpower rivalries to play out in the region, but instead persistent entities that 
frequently dealt with issues impacting Chinese national interests.  As Beijing hesitantly 
began attending meetings and summits, it increased China’s engagement of these 
institutions, particularly in their formative stages, such as the ARF, when Beijing could 
best influence norms, rules, and procedures; ostensibly to prevent regional actors from 
acting counter to Chinese interests.  Jianwei Wang states, “China’s relations with 
ASEAN have gradually moved from dialogue cooperation to institutionalized 
cooperation,” and that “Beijing has now become increasingly proactive, sometimes 
taking initiatives in promoting institutionalization of the China-ASEAN cooperation.”105  
                                                 
102 Goldstein, 48. 
103 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia – Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, 
vol. 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/2005), 70. 
104 Shambaugh, 69. 
105 Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in Yong Deng and Fei-
Ling Wang, ed., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, (Lanham, MD: Roman 
and Littlefield, 2005), 168 
40 
As Beijing’s approach to foreign policy evolves, its experiences with international 
diplomacy will likely have a direct effect on policy decisions.  However, while Chinese 
elites “learn the game,” they are not likely to forget domestic interests, particularly in the 
near-term as economic disparities continually threaten to emerge as a divisive force.   
Of the many Chinese domestic interests, national sovereignty appears to reign 
supreme.  In fact, Beijing seems obsessed with keeping China whole.  While Mao 
Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are seen increasingly as 
disastrous periods in PRC history, the common people continue to see Mao as a positive 
actor in China’s history.  “He unified China” and “he is the father of modern China” are 
frequent responses to questions regarding Mao’s continued good stature among the 
Chinese populace.106  (However, adoration often stops there as Mao’s ideological views 
and programs set Chinese economic growth back decades.)  Today’s Chinese leadership 
still perceives the growth initiated under Deng Xiaoping and continued today as essential 
to addressing the economic disparities that potentially create divisive undercurrents, 
thereby undoing the China’s nearly complete consolidation into a stable nation state.107  
Though many claim the reforms are worsening these disparities, Beijing takes no stock in 
this view, opting to stay the course.  Consequently, Beijing continues to pursue economic 
growth as the answer to continued domestic stability and national security. 
The closure of the U.S. bases in the Philippines in the mid-1990s temporarily 
reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. security umbrella as the United States reduced its 
forward presence while facilities in Singapore meant to allow rapid redeployment to the 
region were not yet completed.  While an essential component of China’s economic 
growth, increased international diplomacy also constrains Beijing’s use of coercive 
power.  Recent Beijing Xinhua publications on the November 2005 CPC Central 
Committee and State Council central economic work conference indicate that China’s 
leaders believe the international environment has a direct impact on China’s economy. 
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In the near term or even for a considerable period of time to come, the 
international economic environment is generally favorable to our country's 
economic development.  At the same time, we must fully assess 
unfavorable factors and possible challenges in the international 
environment.  We must take full advantage of the period of important 
strategic opportunities, seek advantages and avoid disadvantages, 
maintain sustained and fairly rapid economic growth, and continuously 
enhance our country's overall national strength and international 
competitiveness 108
From this statement, it is reasonable to assert that the fourth generation leaders do 
not think of “national strength” and “international competitiveness” merely in economic 
terms, but also in political terms.  Such a belief would help explain their shift in foreign 
relations approaches.  The disadvantages include the constraints that international 
diplomacy places on China.  However, while diplomacy constrains China in some ways, 
it empowers it in others.  Consequently, Beijing appears willing to work within the rules 
and norms of international arena in order to effectively use it to pursue Chinese interests.  
These boundaries have become increasingly acceptable to Chinese leaders as they evolve 
further from ideology and more towards normalcy, and the current administration is far 
better equipped to work within them than in previous regimes. 
2. Shifts in Perceptions of Self, International Actors and Environment 
As discussed earlier, Beijing historically viewed international institutions as 
puppets of the great powers meant to constrain other actors.  However, after the Cold 
War, Chinese leaders saw a decrease in U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific, 
particularly in Southeast Asia.  Simultaneously, as regional institutions formed to fill the 
void this withdrawal created, the United States appeared largely disinterested.  
Consequently, China’s perception of both the United States and regional institutions 
changed.  As Medeiros and Fravel state in their 2003 Foreign Affairs article, “Chinese 
leaders began to recognize that such [multilateral] organizations could allow their country 
to promote its trade and security interests and limit American input.  Thus, starting in the  
 
 
                                                 
108  FBIS, CPP20051201057037, Translation of, “(Current Events) Central Economic Work 
Conference Held in Beijing; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, 
Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, Luo Gan Attend Conference,” Beijing Xinhua 
Domestic Service in Chinese, (01 December 2005).  Emphasis added. 
42 
second half of the 1990s, China began to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).” 109   As China’s development continued at a record pace, the 
leadership also shifted its view of the People’s Republic itself. 
Within the last three years…the writings of Chinese strategists have begun 
to reflect a critical shift in their view of the international system and 
China’s role in it…major Chinese newspapers and journals [are] 
advocating that China abandon the long-held victim mentality (shouhaizhe 
xintai) [受害者心態]…Influential Chinese analyst have begun to promote 
instead China’s adoption of a ‘great-power mentality’ (daguo xintai)  
[大國 心態].  This emerging notion would replace Chinese victimhood 
with a confidence born of two decades of impressive economic growth.110
Having survived the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, emerged from 
the Cold War in tact, and successfully quelled dissent in both the hinterland of Tibet and 
the heart of Beijing, Chinese leaders have reason to feel confident.  The current 
leadership in Beijing strongly feels the desire to attain great power status.  The 
understanding of how the international community defines this status, garnered through 
increased diplomatic interaction, augments Beijing’s ability to attain it.  This drives 
China’s attempts to increase what Chinese elites call “comprehensive national power” 
(CNP) or zong he guo li (綜合國力), a term increasingly seen in official Chinese media 
which essentially translates to the sum of China’s economic, political, and military 
strength.  Chinese leaders remain primarily focused on economic growth but understand 
the important role that international politics plays in international commerce and 
investment, both key components of China’s economy. 
The changes [in China’s foreign policy approach] represent an attempt by 
China’s recent leaders to break out of their post-Tiananmen isolation, 
rebuild their image, protect and promote Chinese economic interests, and 
enhance their security; they also demonstrate an attempt to hedge against 
American influence around the world.  The prominence of this motivation 
varies in China’s public statements over time, but it remains a persistent 
influence in Beijing’s calculations.111
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In a 2000 RAND study, Swaine and Tellis outline China’s grand strategy in terms 
of three objectives: “the preservation of domestic order…the defense against persistent 
external threats to national sovereignty and territory…[and] the attainment and 
maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps primary, state.” 112   
Additionally, the two authors present their theory of China’s “calculative” security 
strategy.  They argue that Beijing pursues both weak and strong state actions, essentially 
applying international relations theory with Chinese characteristics, to produce a 
“weak-strong” state security strategy blending “strong-state” actions to control China’s 
periphery and “weak-state” approaches focused on territorial defense and the preservation 
diplomatic maneuvering.113  Their approach supports this chapter’s argument that the 
Chinese are learning diplomatic maneuvering as a means of pursuing Chinese national 
interests.   
The Chinese government operates within its comfort zone, occasionally venturing 
into new and untested territory.  Ian Storey posits, “The occupation [of Mischief Reef in 
1995] may also have been aimed at testing the reactions of ASEAN and the United States 
to Chinese policy.  One of the most significant aspects of the incident is that it was the 
first time that China had occupied territory claimed by an ASEAN member.”114  This 
follows a trend in the PRC’s approach to alliance testing, Beijing testing the U.S.-ROC 
relationship in the 1950s by shelling the Taiwanese structures on Quemoy and Matsu 
islands, and again in 1996 by conducting missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait to 
dissuade Taiwanese independence and U.S. “interference” in what Beijing regards as a 
domestic matter. 
The PRC occupation of Mischief Reef sent a message to ASEAN members that 
bilateral agreements with China are ineffective. 115   Chinese leaders perceived the 
organization as having a fractured view of China and thereby, was incapable of a unified 
response and ASEAN’s unity over Mischief Reef, “surprised observers and most likely 
                                                 
112 Michael D. Swaine, Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy – Past, Present, and 
Future, (Washington DC: RAND, 2000), x. 
113 Ibid., xi. 
114 Storey, 101. 
115 Storey, 101. 
44 
Beijing as well.”116  As discussed earlier in this chapter, ASEAN acted contrary to 
China’s desires by adding the South China Sea disputes to the ARF agenda at their 
second meeting.  Beijing’s misperception of ASEAN cost it some political and 
diplomatic maneuvering room and taught Chinese diplomats and leaders that no matter 
how weak and divided an organization appears to be, its members can quickly unite when 
it is in their collective interest.  A logical presumption from this lesson learned is that 
Chinese leaders must better understand the perceived national interests of other leaders, 
as this understanding increases their ability to better predict the reactions of these nations.  
These perceptions color how leaders view issues and subsequent decisions and failure to 
understand them can prove costly, as Beijing found out after Mischief Reef.  
Consequently, the next section of this thesis examines how differences between today’s 
Chinese bureaucracy and leadership from their predecessors potentially shape the 
perceptions and decisions of the fourth generation leaders. 
a. The Evolution of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
In his article, “China Engages Asia,” David Shambaugh recalls a June 
2004 interview with Cui Tiankai, director general of Asian affairs in China’s MFA in 
which Cui stated, “It [international diplomacy] was a gradual learning process for us, as 
we needed to become more familiar with how these organizations worked and learn how 
to play the game.”117  Indeed, the MFA knew very little about international relations 
during the time that the KMT regime in Taiwan still held the majority of Chinese seats in 
international organizations and forums.  Having no access to international institutions, 
early Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders saw little use in understanding them.  
Consequently, the MFA consisted of a handful of PLA officials who essentially held 
these jobs as additional duties to their Party and PLA roles.  These “diplomats” had no 
formal training and likely paid little attention to the foreign affairs of non-communist 
nations, believing two things: first, that international institutions were merely theater for 
great power politics, and second, that communism would eventually overcome these  
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other powers, thereby making their norms, rules and even their approaches to foreign 
relations irrelevant.  Additionally, as with all initial CCP leaders, MFA members tended 
to be older, proven revolutionaries.118   
After Beijing assumed China’s UN seat in 1971, its ability to interact with 
international organizations through “normal” diplomatic channels dramatically increased.  
Beijing found itself lacking the training and experience for nuanced diplomacy.  
Consequently, China’s initial approach to diplomacy was notably coarse and wooden, 
usually containing at least echoes of revolutionary politics if not outright quotations of 
Marxist-Leninist or Maoist propaganda.  The Chinese government, while maintaining its 
one party nature, is increasingly behaving like a “normal” national government, taking 
into account multiple interests when formulating domestic and international policies.  
Today’s MFA is drastically different, employing approximately 4,000 personnel, most of 
whom studied international relations, comparative politics, and diplomacy at the 
university level.119  Additionally, members of the MFA have extensively studied modern 
political science and international relations theories.  Consequently, as these theories and 
ideas proliferate throughout the Chinese government, they show up in policy 
decisions.120
China’s third generation leadership began elevating the role of diplomacy 
in the 1990s and the fourth generation has followed suit.  The 1996-97 Asian Financial 
Crisis presented Beijing with an opportunity to either exploit its Southeast Asian 
neighbors or build its regional, and possibly global, reputation.  In April 2001, the 
collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter presented 
Chinese leaders with another choice, flexing its military muscle or alleviating tensions 
through diplomacy.  The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 
presented another opportunity for nations to diplomatically engage the United States, an 
opportunity that Beijing took full advantage.  Most recently, the aftermath of Hurricane 
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Katrina in the southern United States in August 2005 provided China with yet another 
unexpected prospect for fostering Sino-U.S. ties and improving its global reputation as a 
responsible member of the world community.  This chapter now briefly examines each of 
events and the role that Chinese diplomacy played in them. 
China’s “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia during the later half of the 
1990s and Beijing’s adept handling of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1996 and 1997 are 
key examples of well-planned and executed Chinese diplomacy.  China’s decision during 
the Asian Financial Crisis not to devaluate its currency, the renminbi (人民幣) and to 
contribute to the IMF’s Southeast Asia recovery fund as well as to individual Southeast 
Asian governments is still paying off dividends today.121
The MFA is developing Chinese diplomacy to an art, most notably, having 
helped avoid a military clash with the United States in April 2001, after the collision of a 
PLANAF F-8 and a U.S. Navy EP-3.  While the initial Chinese reaction was the PLA’s 
heavy handed internment of the U.S. Navy aircrew, the MFA engaged in 11 days of 
“intensive diplomacy”122 with the United States setting on the following statement from 
the U.S. Ambassador to China,  
Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei 
that we are very sorry for their loss.  Although the full picture of what 
transpired is still unclear, according to our information, our severely 
crippled aircraft made an emergency landing after following international 
emergency procedures.  We are very sorry the entering of China's airspace 
and the landing did not have verbal clearance, but very pleased the crew 
landed safely.123
Despite calls for retribution from the Chinese populace and some senior 
PLA officials and a strong skepticism of the sincerity of the U.S. statement, the crisis 
quickly blew over.  In the United States, many military members privately expressed  
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outraged at the incident and it is reasonable to believe that members of the PLA felt the 
same way.  However, in the end both nations’ military leaders saluted smartly and 
deferred to the terms negotiated by the civilian bureaucracy. 
The Chinese diplomatic corps also scored big with its response to the 
11 September terrorist attacks on the United States that same year.  On 12 September 
2001, the PRC voted affirmatively on UN Security Council resolution 1368, marking the 
first time Beijing has ever voted in favor of the international use of force.124  This drew 
the praise of then Secretary of State Colin Powell, who testified before the U.S. Congress 
in February 2002, “China has helped in the war against terrorism,” while U.S. officials 
claiming that the level of support and intelligence sharing was “not specific enough” to 
be particularly useful.125  These MFA efforts effectively averted, or at least postponed, 
the heavily predicted Cold War between the United States and China.   
The coup de grace appears to be Beijing’s response to the tragedy in the 
United States resulting from August 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.  This response highlights 
the apparent Chinese trend towards reaping positive returns from diplomatic actions.  On 
03 September 2005, China promised to send upwards of five million U.S. dollars in aid, 
including personnel to assist in “epidemic prevention,” to the areas of the United States 
affected by the storm, a promise Beijing is keeping.126  The U.S. Air Force reported 
receiving over 100 tons of humanitarian aid at Littlerock AFB, Arkansas less than a week 
after MFA’s announcement with more expected.127
The Chinese aid announcements themselves tell us something of the 
MFA’s current approach to international diplomacy.  Beijing’s official Xinhua News 
Agency published remarks from the spokesperson for the MFA, Qin Gang, and the Vice 
                                                 
124 U.S. State Department, “Africa, South Asia, and East Asia Overviews,” Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2001, 16 (marked page 40/204 in .PDF format).  Online: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf. Accessed 24 October 2005. 
125 Shirley Kan, U.S.-China Counter-terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy, (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2003), 2-3. Online: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21995.pdf. Accessed 23 October 2005. 
126 FBIS, “PRC FM Spokesman: China To Give $5 Million Relief Aid to US Hurricane-Hit Region,” 
CPP20050903000138. Translation of Unattributed, “Chinese Government Provides Aid To US Hurricane 
Disaster Region,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese Dated: 0938 GMT 03 Sep 05. 
127 Technical Sergeant Arlo Taylor, “Little Rock welcomes China hurricane aid,” Internet: 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123011709, 09 September 2005.  Accessed 12 October 2005. 
48 
Minister of Commerce Ma Xiuhong.128  The involvement of the commerce ministry 
demonstrates the importance that Beijing places on economics and trade and indicates the 
Chinese perception of a direct relationship between international commerce and 
international diplomacy.  Additionally, Hu Jintao immediately agreed to postpone a 
scheduled meeting with President George W. Bush to allow the U.S. leader to focus on 
relief efforts in the effected region.  Rather than demand an audience according to 
schedule, the Chinese president took a more diplomatic and pragmatic approach.  By 
acknowledging the U.S. President’s necessary shift in priorities, Hu Jintao showed 
increasing understanding of, and possibly even sensitivity to the domestic politics of the 
United States, and arguably other nations, that appears throughout recent Chinese foreign 
policy endeavors.  The current crop of Chinese leaders appears to behave differently than 
its predecessors.  The chapter now examines what makes these leaders different, and 
more importantly, whether these differences play a role in Chinese policy decision 
making. 
b. China’s Fourth Generation Leadership – Its’ Not Your Father’s 
CCP 
The ascension of technocratic elites to the pinnacle of China’s civilian 
leadership allows changes to the rest of the political and diplomacy bureaucracy as well 
and helps explain the changes in Beijing’s perception of itself, China as a nation, and the 
international order in general.  As previously discussed, some of these changes stem from 
lessons learned by the Deng and Jiang regimes, but others come from the differences in 
the fourth generation leaders themselves.  This portion of Chapter III explains that while 
China’s national interests remain largely the same as they have been for the past two 
decades, Beijing’s perception of the best means to achieve them is different, and largely 
due to the different nature of the Hu Jintao regime.   
As the Mao Zedong clique’s strong ideology prevented the full 
implementation of economic reforms, the Hu administration’s perceptions of China and 
the international environment enables the Chinese government to work with other nations 
in ways more in keeping with Westphalian-style diplomacy.  H. Lyman Miller and Liu 
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Xiaohong’s contribution to Lampton’s volume describes the emergence of these 
technocrats and argue that today’s Chinese leadership acts differently because they are 
indeed very different from their predecessors.  Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping represent 
the PRC’s revolutionary period and their regimes performed accordingly while the Jiang 
Zemin regime served as a transition to today’s government, one more in congruence with 
the “normal” international economic and diplomatic environments.  Miller and Liu 
compare the Deng and Jiang administrations noting, “The differences between the present 
leadership around Jiang and the 1982 leadership around Deng Xiaoping are stark and 
dramatic.”129  They go on to compare the revolutionary experiences of the first and 
second generation leaders, most having been integral parts of the CCP victory over the 
KMT in 1949 while the third generation was in their childhood.  Most members of the Hu 
administration, or fourth generation leadership, were not even born in 1949 and one can 
expect that their memories of the Great Leap Forward are vague at best.  However, 
during the Cultural Revolution they were in high school or university and consequently, 
were the focus of Mao’s attempts to revitalize the Chinese revolutionary spirit.  This 
group swallowed more ideological propaganda than any other had, but they also 
witnessed firsthand the divisive effects of the Cultural Revolution as Chinese society slid 
into chaos, almost tumbling the nation into another civil war.  While the differences 
between the Jiang and Hu governments are not as vast as those between Jiang and Deng, 
they are still significant. 
The Hu administration includes some of the most well educated, with less 
than five members of the current Politburo lacking a university education and most 
holding degrees in technical fields such as engineering or the physical sciences, and well-
traveled Chinese in modern history.  During the last four years preceding their 
appointments, the latest members of the Politburo Standing Committee made over 40 
overseas trips.130  Conversely, during his entire life, Mao Zedong only left China twice 
and Deng Xiaoping made less than half the number of overseas trips during his tenure of 
nearly 20 years as Hu Jintao has during the mere three years from 2002 through today.  
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Hu Jintao’s appointment to chairman of the Central Military Commissions in September 
2004 and March 2005, marked the first leadership transition in the history of communist 
governments in which the military played a minimal, if indeed any, role.  Additionally 
the rhetorical exchanges and political maneuvering of the Mao and Deng eras were 
absent during this latest transition.  While Deng and Jiang maneuvered PLA officers into 
various political positions to garner their support, Hu supported the PLA’s depolitization 
and a firmer civilian control of the military.  In the current administration, only two PLA 
members, General Guo Boxiong and General Cao Gangchuan, serve on the Politburo and 
neither of them are members of the Politburo Standing Committee.  As a result, the 
PLA’s direct and institutional role in Chinese policymaking is vastly smaller than it was 
during the conflicts with Vietnam during the 1970s and early 1990s. 
Given the increased institutionalization of the Chinese government and 
depersonalization of its central leadership figures, we can expect the Hu Jintao regime to 
be even less oriented to using force in the South China Sea than the Deng or Jiang 
regimes.  Considering his firsthand knowledge of the Cultural Revolution while a student 
at Qinghua University and his imposition of martial law in Tibet while serving as the 
regional Party Committee Secretary, it is reasonable to presume that President Hu is 
aware of China’s economically disadvantaged interior regions and that his administration 
continually focuses on these potential flashpoints.131  Like the Deng and Jiang regimes, 
Hu Jintao and his surrounding leadership are supportive of continued economic growth 
and, consequently, continued economic reform.132  However, their regional origins and 
political experiences are very different from the Jiang and Deng leadership and this 
drives them to make different decisions. 
Hu Jintao was born in the interior Anhui province and rose to power in 
Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet, none considered garden spots and all struggling with 
economic disparity vis-à-vis China’s coastal regions.  Consequently, it is no surprise that 
Hu’s administration focuses more on domestic issues than the second and third 
generation regimes.  As alluded to earlier, having experienced the folly of forced material 
                                                 
131 H. Lyman Miller, “The Succession of Hu Jintao,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 1, part 2, 
(January 2002), 5-8. 
132 This is a frequent theme in Beijing’s official press publications, the most recent being the 01 
December 2005 statement regarding the Central Economic Work Conference (see footnote 120). 
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redistribution during the Mao era, China’s fourth generation leaders seem to believe that 
they can only solve economic disparity through continued growth and development, 
despite mounting opinion that this may not be the case.  Essentially, trickle-down 
economics theory is alive and well in Hu’s China, but as with all things, it has Chinese 
characteristics.  Hu is pressing forward with incentives for Chinese and foreign investors 
to aid the development of the Chinese interior in the hopes that the resultant progress 
towards xiaokang shehui (小康社會) — “ a harmonious society” and a “comfortable 
standard of living” — will help alleviate rising social pressures.  To ensure this 
continuation of economic growth, the Hu government continues Jiang Zemin’s efforts to 
integrate China into the international economic and diplomatic orders.  Chinese actions, 
which on the surface appear to support constructivist or neoliberal institutionalist theories, 
are also easily explained by investigating the national interests Beijing perceives were at 
stake during the decision making process, thus possibly explaining the success of Bueno 
de Mesquita’s expected utility theory.  Beijing appears to approach its economic, 
political, and military policies from a balance of power logic, but it has also begun taking 
into account the perceptions and environments of other international players, thereby 
making the Hu Jintao administration primarily neorealist in orientation and actions, but 
also highly conscious of the perceptions and interests of domestic and international 
actors. 
David Lampton sums up the fourth generation leadership well, “China’s 
elite will show no less dedication to the PRC’s interests in the future than in the past, but 
gradually, by fits and starts, even narrow calculations of national interest may produce 
progressively more cooperative behavior.”133  China is beginning to see itself as a rising 
power and an international actor, the daguo xintai (大國 心態) mentioned earlier in this 
chapter.  Consequently, Beijing understands the need to approach other nations in terms 
and within frameworks to which they can relate.  This partially explains China’s shift 
from military action to diplomacy.  However, diplomacy serves another purpose, to  
 
 
                                                 
133 David M. Lampton, “Introduction,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign 
and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 36. 
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ensure the continual increase in China’s international trade, a key component to 
economic growth and, as previously stated, Beijing still perceives economic growth as 
the key to maintaining domestic political security. 
3. Military Action and Chinese Trade 
Many promoters of economic interdependence claim that Beijing adjusted its 
South China Sea policy away from military coercion in favor of peaceful diplomacy to 
maintain its international trade in general and trade with Southeast Asia specifically.  
David Shambaugh adds himself to list of proponents of an economic explanation by 
stating, “Over the next two decades, the principal challenge for the Chinese leadership 
will be to provide a range of public goods to the populace and improve the nation’s 
quality of life.”134  Advocates of the economic interdependence theory argue that the 
trade required to maintain these necessary domestic improvements directly affects 
China’s political behavior. 
An analysis of data from the International Monetary Fund regarding Chinese trade 
indicates that fans of the economic interdependence theory may indeed be on to 
something.  Throughout the 1990s, economic growth in Asia outstripped any other 
region.135  This burgeoning market sector provides Beijing with many of the natural 
resources necessary to produce Chinese exports, a major sector of China’s economy. 
As Figure 6 shows, in 1989, the rate of increase for Chinese imports from the 
ASEAN 6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and 
the United States dropped to half the 1988 rate and imports from Europe actually 
decreased.  In 1990, Chinese imports from all three trading partners decreased by almost 
twenty percent.  This timeframe correlates to Beijing’s harsh suppression of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square demonstrations; however, in December 1989, Beijing devalued its 
official exchange rate by 21.2 percent, accounting to the proportional decrease across the 
three trading partners.136  A similarly proportional trend occurs in 1996, China’s imports 
from the three again dropped by almost half.  This could indicate their economic response 
                                                 
134 Shambaugh, 98. 
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no. 2 (Spring 2003), 58. 
136 Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
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to the both Chinese buildup on Mischief Reef and the missile exercises in the Taiwan 
Straits.  However, this also marks a period of economic retrenchment in China, as Beijing 





































Figure 6.   Percentage changes in PRC Imports 1987-2003.137 
 
An investigation of Chinese exports to the ASEAN 6 and the United States during 
the same period also shows a correlation to political tensions with China.  However, 
while Chinese domestic economic policies explain the changes vis-à-vis PRC imports, 
the same logic cannot apply to exports.  Exporting to China provides trading partners 
with a clear benefit, payment for the goods Beijing imports, obviously importing from 
China is the exact opposite scenario.  While consumers of Chinese exports enjoy lower 





                                                 
137 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: IMF 
Publication Services, 1987-2004).  The author compiled a spreadsheet using data from all volumes 
published from 1978, the earliest IMF records for China, until 2004.  In the event of discrepancies, this 
author defaulted to the most recent data. 
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if such a policy can alter negative Chinese behavior.  Additionally, consumers’ personal 
perceptions can also reduce the demand for imported goods, be they from China or 
anywhere else, with France being a prime and recent example.138
Slower rates of increase for PRC exports to the United States tightly correlate to 
1989’s Tiananmen Square incident, the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, and the 2001 
EP-3/F-8 collision.  From 1995 to 1996, Chinese exports to the United States and Europe 
slowed from an increase of approximately 15 percent to 10 percent and from 27 percent 
to only six percent respectively, though exports to those regions still increased.  More 
importantly, however, are PRC exports to the ASEAN 6 during the same period, which 
increased by 40 percent in 1995 but plummeted in 1996, decreasing by almost two 
percent only to return in 1997 to a healthy 23 percent increase.  Beijing would not see 
such an incredibly large drop in exports to ASEAN again until the effects of the Asian 
financial crisis took full effect in 1998.  However, in 1995 and 1996, the ASEAN 
economies were still vibrant, as demonstrated by the 1997 rebound, leaving little room 
for any other interpretation than ASEAN cut off Chinese exports in response to Mischief 
Reef and the Taiwan missile crisis. 
 
                                                 
138 The perceived lack of French support for U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
unleashed an unofficial U.S. boycott of French products.  See Robert J. McCartney, “U.S. Boycott Being 
Felt, French Say: Wine Sales Off Sharply; Other Products Affected,” Washington Post, (April 16, 2003), 
A32.  Also online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A33986-2003Apr15%3Flanguage=printer.  





































Figure 7.   Percentage changes in PRC Exports 1987-2003.139 
 
Consequently, Beijing’s adoption of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct in the 
South China Sea is most likely a result of China’s need for ASEAN’s cooperation in 
implementing the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed in November 2001.  
ASEAN’s ability to maintain a united front regarding the seizure of territories in the 
South China Sea allows a linkage between China’s approach to the claims and other 
issues important to Chinese national interests, economic trade being the most 
important. 140   Consequently, this linkage effectively restricts Beijing from military 
asserting Chinese claims. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The changes [in China’s foreign policy approach] may have been slow and 
subtle, to be sure, but their significance is huge…  Not only does China 
now accept many prevailing international rules and institutions; it is 
becoming a much more capable and adept player of the diplomatic game.  
When opportunities for cooperation exist, Beijing will bring much more to 
the table than in the past.  But these developments also may have another 
result that American policymakers must not lose sight of: as China  
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expands its influence and refines its diplomacy, it will also get better at 
protecting its own interests – even when they conflict with those of the 
United States.141
Beijing’s choices in the South China Sea remain constrained by economic, 
political, and security interests.  China currently cannot seize its South China Sea claims 
militarily as the PLAN and PLAAF lack the power projection capability not only to 
obtain the islands and islets, but more importantly, to effectively patrol and defend them.  
While China continues to pursue these capabilities, most notably green or blue water 
naval ships, improved naval and aerial command and control, and aerial refueling 
capabilities, they remain a distant possibility and their acquisition is most likely focused 
on operations in the Taiwan Strait, not the South China Sea.  Additionally, the last two 
displays of military aggression, the 1996 missile exercises against Taiwan and the 1989 
suppression of anti-regime demonstrators in Tiananmen Square proved that such action 
greatly degrades China’s reputation in the eyes of the world.  While China has largely 
recovered from these events, Beijing cannot ignore the fact that world opinion matters, 
directly influencing diplomatic and political outcomes in ways counterproductive for the 
Chinese. 
China could revoke its territorial claims but doing so is a gamble Beijing is, and 
should be, unwilling to take.  Even within ASEAN, the other South China Sea claimants 
remain unable to resolve disputes amongst themselves, let alone the disputes between 
them and China, and Beijing’s removal would far from guarantee continued Chinese 
access to the region or its resources should it become economically feasible to extract 
them.  The allure of the South China Sea territories for Beijing is their role in maintaining 
unfettered access to trade routes and natural resources, both critical ingredients for 
continued China’s economic growth and subsequently, the legitimacy of the CCP regime.  
Additionally, right or wrong, Beijing fears a snowball effect.  Though the South China 
Sea territories are uninhabited, yielding them to the other claimants, or even to the realm 
of international waters, could still embolden Tibet, Xinjiang, and most importantly, 
Taiwan to attempt succession, all thoroughly unacceptable outcomes for Beijing. 
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China could choose to do nothing, adhering to the calculative strategy described 
earlier in this chapter.  Maintaining the status quo costs Beijing nothing and keeps all 
options open, including a reversion to military coercion and offensive actions should 
Chinese power projection become viable.  Additionally, the continued diplomatic and 
economic interactions with the other claimants and interested parties allow Beijing to 
attempt socializing these players, enabling China to establish or adjust the region’s norms 
and rules, or at least desensitize SEA nations to Chinese political and military 
maneuvering.  From a Chinese perspective, the worst that this strategy produces is the 
continued postponement of dispute resolution while the best case is the peaceful 
acquisition of guaranteed Chinese access to the South China Sea’s sea lines of 
communication and natural resources.  China’s acceptance of the 2002 “Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” combined with its negotiation of joint 
resource explorations with Vietnam and the Philippines shows Beijing’s clear preference 
for and implementation of this option. 
In strong support of economic interdependence theory, Chinese military coercion 
appears to have a direct impact on trade with both ASEAN and the United States.  
Beijing’s halt to military action in the region combined with its increased diplomatic 
engagement of ASEAN, specifically the ARF, and economic diplomacy during the Asian 
Financial crisis produced a shift in ASEAN’s perceptions of China.  The acceptance of 
the 2002 declaration on conduct shows an increasing mastery of China’s diplomatic 
policy towards Southeast Asia, providing Beijing likely guaranteed access to a large 
portion of the region’s natural resources.  This evolution of China’s approach to 
international relations will continue, as Beijing now knows that diplomacy can often 
pursue Chinese interests more cheaply than military coercion.  However, China continues 
developing and enhancing its military capabilities, both as a trapping of great power 




IV. POTENTIAL FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN A SOUTH CHINA 
SEA CONFLICT AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As this thesis previously discussed, the increasing volume of maritime trade 
through the South China Sea makes it an area of interest for all members of the global 
market economy.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many regarded the South China Sea 
region as one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world.  However, the United 
States has paid little attention to the region’s territorial disputes since the late 1990s.  The 
past thirty years involved no less than 13 armed clashes in the region, clashes that, if a 
U.S.-flagged ship were to appear in the wrong place at the wrong time, had the potential 
to pull the United States into a regional conflict, at least diplomatically if not militarily.  
A worse scenario involves China successfully enforcing its archipelagic claims.  Such a 
move would sharply curtail the legal status of U.S. ships. 
The United States also faces an image problem in the region stemming from false 
perceptions that it abandoned the region after the Cold War and largely ignored the Asian 
financial crisis in 1996-97.  Additionally, the increased Sino-ASEAN engagement 
threatens to limit U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, thereby potentially affecting the 
substantial amount of trade the United States conducts with the region.  The claimants’ 
approaches to the region appear to be converging on cooperative diplomacy and these 
negotiations to date have not involved the United States.  Consequently, the United States 
must continually monitor the situation and have a variety of policy options readily 
available in case events disrupt the status quo.  The United States has a handful of policy 
options it could pursue, ranging from doing nothing to dramatically revamping its 
security approach to the region.  This chapter reviews these options, their pros and cons, 
and concludes with a recommendation for U.S. policy makers. 
B. U.S. OBLIGATIONS 
The United States has a formal defense treaty with only one of the South China 
Sea claimants, the Republic of the Philippines.  Taiwan is on the other side of the 
political spectrum, having no official contacts with Washington, and conduct unofficial 
relations through the Taiwan Relations Act, which faces annual scrutiny by the U.S. 
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Congress and ostensibly only allows the United States to provide for the self-defense “of 
the people on Taiwan,”142 not Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea.  Brunei recently 
entered a memorandum of understanding with Washington regarding defense cooperation, 
but this is a far cry from a U.S. security or defense obligation with the sultanate.  The 
remaining claimants – China, Vietnam, and Indonesia – have diplomatic and economic 
relations with the United States and limited military exchanges, but nothing more.  U.S. 
relations with this last group have historically swung as if on a pendulum ax, the speed 
and direction depending on the U.S. interests vis-à-vis those nations, the South China Sea 
region, and the world as perceived by the presiding administration. 
1. Mutual Defense Treaties 
The United States has a mutual defense treaty with only one South China Sea 
claimant, the Republic of the Philippines.  The treaty, signed on 30 August 1951, is in 
accordance with the commitments of other U.S. defense treaties in East Asia.  In August 
1998, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon publicly stated that, the United States 
is bound to help the Philippines if attacked in the Spratly Islands.143  However, this 
interpretation of the treaty is highly suspect.  Article IV, “Action in event of armed 
attack,” of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the 
Philippines states, 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of 
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its 
constitutional processes.  Any such armed attack and all measures taken as 
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the United Nations.  Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.144
However, Article V, “Territorial applications,” limits the scope of the treaty to 
“an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island 
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific.”  Manila did not declare its claims to Kalaya’an or any other South 
China Sea territories until its 1978 Presidential Decree, and its claim to Scarborough Reef 
was largely unknown before 1997.145  Consequently, U.S. officials can, and in fact, in 
1995 then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did, strongly infer that Filipino 
South China Sea claims are within the scope of the treaty.146  However, Article V does 
mention attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircraft, theoretically 
involving the United States in the Philippines’ seven South China Sea clashes.  The 
failure of a U.S. response to go beyond carefully worded diplomatic statements indicates 
a definite preference for the limited interpretation and as China’s ability to project 
military power into the region improves, Washington is presumably less likely to involve 
itself in a Sino-Philippines spat.  Manila appears to recognize this fact and consequently, 
in the early 2000s, agreed to pursue bilateral and multilateral survey agreements with 
China and Vietnam.  These actions decrease the likelihood of future Filipino military 
clashes over the South China Sea territories. 
U.S. defense relations with the other claimants are significantly less mutually 
supportive and certainly less institutionalized as the U.S.-Philippines treaty.  In fact, there 
is only one other U.S. defense relationship, and that is a mere memorandum of 
understanding, far less stringent than a formal treaty. 
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2. Defense Cooperation Agreements and Understandings 
The United States has no formal mutual defense treaties or agreements with 
Vietnam, China, or Taiwan.147  In the early 1990s, Malaysia and the United States 
interacted through the foreign military sales program as Kuala Lumpur purchased F/A-18 
HORNET and C-130 HERCULES aircraft from the United States as part of an effort to 
expand and modernize the Malaysian armed forces.  However, later that decade the 
Malaysians also purchased MiG-29 FULCRUMs from Russia and in 2003, announced 
plans to buy a variant of the Su-27 FLANKER.148  Clearly, the United States is under no 
defense obligations vis-à-vis Malaysian claims to the South China Sea territories.   
The U.S. defense relationship with Brunei is a more formal arrangement, but only 
slightly so.  In November 1994, the United States signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation with the Brunei government.  Since then, 
the United States engages in joint exercises, training programs, and other military 
cooperation with Brunei's armed forces. 149   The largest scale interaction, called 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training or CARAT, is part of “a series of bilateral 
exercises designed to increase U.S. Sailors' understanding of Southeast Asian 
cultures…enhancing regional cooperation; building friendships between the United States 
and nations involved.”150  These nations include Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Singapore.  While certainly a good idea to gain influence in the Southeast Asian 
region, this is hardly a mechanism through which to involve the United States in a 
conflict over the South China Sea territories. 
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The attainment and protection of national interests drives U.S. foreign policy and 
its relationships with all of the South China Sea claimants should augment this approach.  
These interests range from those essential to the nation’s survival through interests whose 
influence on policymakers varies with domestic and personal preferences. 
C. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The 2000 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) includes a description of the U.S. 
national interests, broken into three groups: 
Vital interests…broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and 
vitality of our nation... physical security of our territory…safety of our 
citizens…economic well-being of our society…protection of our critical 
infrastructures…from paralyzing attack.” 
Important interests…affect our national well-being and the character of 
the world in which we live...for example, regions in which we have a 
sizable economic stake or commitments to allies. 
Humanitarian and other interests… our nation may act because our values 
demand it…The spread of democracy and respect for the rule of law helps 
to create a world community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and 
interests.151
The current U.S. NSS does not spell out U.S. interests so clearly but states,  
Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic 
freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human 
dignity…to achieve these goals, the United States will…work with others 
to defuse regional conflicts…ignite a new era of global economic growth 
through free markets and free trade…152
Bearing this in mind, any significant disturbance of the economic traffic to or 
from the United States harms U.S. interests. 
1. U.S.-ASEAN Economic Ties 
Total shipments through the South China Sea region exceed $500 billion and 
make up approximately 15 percent of the world’s trade.153  In 2003, U.S. waterborne 
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trade with Asia was over 221 million metric tons, most of which traversed the South 
China Sea region.154  Consequently, freedom of navigation through the South China Sea 
for U.S.-flagged ships and those of its trading partners has a direct impact on the 
economic well-being of our society and is therefore a vital national interest.  The various 
claims and their associated disputes currently present few problems for the United States, 
as no one has used military force to address them in more than five years, allowing the 
United States and the world safe access to the region.  However, as discussed in Chapter 
II, if one or more nations assert their claims, the South China Sea region could lose its 
status as international waters, instead becoming territorial or internal waters, allowing the 
claimant government(s) to invoke a long list of political, military, and economic 
restrictions on foreign-flagged ships. 
2. Freedom of Navigation and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) 
The United States should not stand for having to obtain permission from a foreign 
government to traverse the South China Sea, especially given the vast amount of U.S. 
maritime trade that sails through the region on a daily basis. 
a. International Law and Freedom of Navigating the Seas 
As Chapter II explained, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) addresses territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ).  While 
addressing several different contingencies, the UNCLOS essentially defines territorial 
waters as the inclusive water area from a state’s coastline or continental shelf out to 12 
miles.  Article 55 of the UNCLOS defines EEZs as, “the area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are 
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.”  The UNCLOS limits EEZs to 
no more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to establish a state’s territorial 
waters. 
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In November 2001, Ambassador Sichan Siv, the U.S. Representative on the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council stated, 
The United States has long accepted the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea as embodying international law concerning traditional uses of the 
oceans.  The United States played an important role in negotiating the 
Convention…Because the rules of the Convention meet U.S. national 
security, economic, and environmental interests, I am pleased to inform 
you that the Administration of President George W. Bush supports 
accession of the United States to the Convention.155
Ambassador Siv reiterated this position again on 16 November 2004. 
b. U.S. Rights and Duties in Territorial Waters 
The UNCLOS provides a long list of activities that, if performed in 
territorial waters, classifies foreign ships as “prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State.”  Article 19, “Meaning of Innocent Passage,” lists the threat 
or use of force against the coastal State, any exercise or practice with weapons of any 
kind, any act aimed at collecting information, any act of propaganda, launching, landing 
or taking on board of any aircraft, and the launching, landing or taking on board of any 
military device among these activities.  The UNCLOS leaves the definition of these terms 
unclear, allowing for several interpretations; e.g., some could claim the mere presence of 
U.S. warships is a threat of force or an act of propaganda.  The accusers would likely be 
proven wrong later but the damage would already be done.  Admittedly, this is an 
extreme scenario, one that U.S. ships currently regard as a non-issue, but a remote 
possibility remains a possibility, and all possibilities require review, even if only 
perfunctory, by U.S. decision makers before declaring a national policy.  Ostensibly, this 
is why the United States has signed only an agreement to the implementation of Part XI 
of the UNCLOS, and not the actual convention in its entirety. 
c. U.S. Rights and Duties in EEZs 
The UNCLOS articles regarding the rights and duties of other states in 
EEZs are less restrictive than those in territorial waters.  States operating in EEZs must 
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state and other rules of 
international law.  While the rights of the coastal states are in the EEZ are conversely 
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more restricted in EEZs than in their territorial waters, UNCLOS Article 73 states that 
coastal states may take measures to maintain their sovereignty, including boarding, 
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, “as necessary” to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations.  However, despite the legal provisions to take these actions, nations 
largely invoke them. 
In addition, there are four major trends affecting U.S. interests in the 
South China Sea – the increased U.S. presence in Southeast Asia; a U.S. “image roller 
coaster” in the region; the decrease in regional military tensions; and an increase in 
Sino-ASEAN engagement. 
3. Major Trends in the South China Sea Affecting U.S. Interests 
The politics and security of Southeast Asia have a direct effect on the ability of 
the United States to pursue its national interests in the region.  One possible factor in the 
reasons behind the increase in military assertion of the disputed claims during the 1990s 
was the virtual withdrawal of a U.S. military presence in the region following the closure 
of U.S. bases in the Philippines.  Since the terror attacks on 11 September 2001, the U.S. 
military is back in Southeast Asia, though some U.S. officials state that the arrangement 
is not permanent.  However, this increased presence is not welcomed by all Southeast 
Asians.  The U.S. shift to unilateral action has potentially damaged relations, particularly 
with Muslim majority nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia.  The U.S. image in the 
region continues to follow a sinusoidal pattern, essentially a political and diplomatic 
“roller coaster” ride.  Also affecting U.S. policy options towards the territorial disputes is 
the decrease in military tensions, as claimants are regularly attending negotiations and are 
increasingly drafting and implementing bilateral and multilateral solutions.  Finally, the 
drastically increased Sino-ASEAN engagement must factor into the U.S. decisions 
regarding these disputes and Southeast Asian regional issues in general.  U.S policy 
makers must take all of these trends into account when formulating and weighing options. 
a. Increased U.S. Presence in Southeast Asia 
Prior to September 11, 2001, many Southeast Asia nations perceived that 
the role and interest of the United States in the region was waning.  In May of 1999, a 
Philippine naval vessel collided with and sank a Chinese fishing boat.  A few weeks later, 
Manila accused the PLAN of “harassing” a Philippine navy ship that accidentally became 
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grounded near the Spratly Islands.  ASEAN’s lack of action against China or the 
Philippines during these incidents was partially based on an uncertainty about U.S. 
backing, as none of the ASEAN members would commit individually to confronting 
China without U.S. power behind them.156  The Global War on Terrorism has brought 
back to Southeast Asia a significant U.S. military and diplomatic presence, with the 
region becoming more important to U.S. interests now than ever before.  The resurgence 
of U.S. aid and bilateral and multinational military exercises in Southeast Asia seeks to 
establish an environment friendly to coalitions with the United States. 
b. U.S. “Image Roller Coaster” in Southeast Asia 
U.S. post-tsunami relief provided a much needed public relations boost for the 
United States, undermining some regional criticism of U.S. policies and helping repair 
the U.S. image in Southeast Asia.  However, throughout much of Southeast Asia, right or 
wrong, strong perceptions persist that the United States consciously failed to assist the 
region during the 1996-97 financial crisis, that the administration is hostile to the region’s 
vast Islamic population, and that the United States is willing and able unilaterally to 
“interfere” with sovereign governments when disagreements surface. 157   Strong 
nationalist sentiments in Southeast Asia clash with these perceptions of U.S. hegemony 
and interference, thereby complicating efforts to increase U.S. influence in the region. 
c. Decreased Military Tensions 
In 1998, the Philippines discovered that China was improving its “fishing 
shelters” on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, essentially building concrete structures 
capable of housing PLAN landing craft and coastal patrol vessels.  At the December 1998 
ASEAN meeting, Manila’s protests failed to spark the multilateral response they did 
during the 1995 Sino-Philippine confrontation.  The regional economic crisis and the East 
Timor situation were the primary focus of ASEAN and their after shocks remain a 
primary ASEAN concern today, with the noted addition of anti-terrorism concerns and 
efforts.  Additionally, the United States reiterated that its bilateral security agreement 
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with the Philippines did not cover its claims in the South China Sea.  Finally, the surge of 
military upgrades and buildups throughout Southeast Asia in the early 1990s have slowed 
significantly since the 1996-97 financial crisis whether due to decreased military tensions 
and competition, or to a shift in economic policies. 
d. Increased Sino-ASEAN Engagement 
The PRC traditionally has been the perceived aggressor in the South China 
Sea.  China’s involvement in nine of the 13 military clashes lends credence to this 
perception.  Additionally, until five years ago, Beijing insisted on settling the South 
China Sea territorial disputes through bilateral agreements, refusing the multilateral 
diplomatic approach of the ARF.  However, in the late 1990s, Beijing began using its 
burgeoning economy to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asia, and Chinese assistance 
during the region’s financial crisis is paying dividends.  In addition to assisting ASEAN 
nations during the crisis, Beijing brokered major free trade agreements with ASEAN and 
East Asian nations.  As previously mentioned in Chapter II, China and the ASEAN 
nations signed a “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” in 
November 2002 which expanded on the 1992 “ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea,” a.k.a. the “Manila Agreement,” which the PRC had not signed.  In addition to the 
contents of the 1992 declaration, the 2002 document adds recognition of the UNCLOS 
and cooperative activities including marine environmental protection, marine scientific 
research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operations, 
and combating transnational crime.158
While publicly celebrated by ASEAN for being the first multilateral 
agreement between the association and China, the Declaration substantively 
accomplishes very little.  Beijing successfully maneuvered ASEAN away from the 
binding Code of Conduct that some of its members demanded, driving the final text 
toward a loosely defined and essentially ignorable document.  However, as Chapter III 
demonstrated, the fact the China was willing to sign the document, risking its newfound 
reputation as an upstanding regional and international citizen, indicates that Beijing’s 
approach has changed.  It appears China’s economic strength and diplomatic prowess 
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may gain Beijing more in the future than Chinese military might has in the past.  Riding 
the success of Beijing’s economic assistance during the financial crisis, China’s increased 
involvement in ASEAN and the ARF offers Beijing an opportunity to deter ASEAN 
nations from involving non-Asian states, most notably the United States, in regional 
matters. 
The United States must take into account each of the aforementioned 
trends in the South China Sea while reviewing its policy regarding the territorial disputes, 
failure to do so risks making a policy decision that will at best be quickly overcome by 
events and at worst negatively affect U.S. interest in the region.  This chapter now 
reviews some of the possible U.S. policies towards these territorial disputes. 
D. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE U.S. POLICY ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
The current U.S. policy on the South China Sea territorial disputes is now a 
decade old and, with the warranted distraction of the Global War on Terrorism, has 
largely been neglected by the decision makers in Washington.  The 2002 “Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” should have served as a reminder that the 
United States must monitor the rapidly changing situation.  Indeed, the U.S. attempts to 
deepen its involvement in the region’s counter-terrorism and anti-piracy policies and 
efforts could provide ample opportunities to ensure the increasing number of agreements 
on the South China Sea territories do not jeopardize the ability of the United States to 
pursue its national interests. 
1. Current U.S. Position 
Until the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, the United States did not have an official 
position on the South China Sea territorial disputes and even then, it was limited to a 
statement regarding the sanctity of freedom of navigation.   
Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United 
States.  Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China 
Sea is essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific 
region, including the United States.  The United States takes no position 
on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various 
islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea.  The United States 




restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not 
consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.159
While this statement makes it clear that the United States strongly prefers a 
resolution mechanism that guarantees freedom of navigation through the region, it does 
not address any of the regional trends identified earlier in this chapter.  Consequently, the 
United States must review its policy regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes or 
risk the policy becoming ineffective, or worse, counter to U.S. interests in the region. 
2. Possible U.S. Policy Options 
The range of alternative U.S. policies towards the South China Sea disputes is 
wide but the number of options is somewhat limited.  The United States could take sides, 
expanding its existing treaty with the Philippines to extend to its claims in the Spratly 
Islands.  Washington could also attempt to build a coalition against Chinese advances in 
the region, though the 2005 Tripartite Agreement between Beijing, Hanoi, and Manila 
makes this largely unlikely.  A third option is to do nothing at all, essentially waiting 
things out in the hopes that the regionally generated outcome does not adversely affect 
U.S. interests.  A fourth, widely discussed approach is the establishment of a regional 
body, possibly through the ARF, to address the disputes.  Finally, the United States could 
side with the UNCLOS solution of deferring the matter to the United Nations, 
specifically the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
a. Expand the U.S.-Philippines Security Treaty to Include the 
South China Sea Territories 
If successful, this policy could guarantee unfettered U.S. passage through 
the eastern half of the Spratly islands due to the cooperative history between Washington 
and Manila as opposed to the historical animosity between the United States and Vietnam 
or China.  This policy would also provide the United States with a clear justification for 
increased U.S. presence in the region and could provide significant leverage over Manila 
regarding political and economic issues.  Including offshore territories in its bilateral 
security agreements would tie U.S. security assistance to any encroachments on 
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Philippine claims in the South China Sea.  This course of action could involve the United 
States in conflicts like the 1995 Mischief Reef incident; however, it could also help to 
deter similar instances from occurring in the future.  While it is true that the Philippines’ 
constitution bans the direct involvement of foreign military forces in operations on 
Philippine soil, exercises such as BALIKITAN show that when it perceives such actions 
would be in the Philippines’ interest, Manila finds ways around this.  To formalize this 
arrangement, could signal a U.S. sanctioning of inevitable Philippine actions to remove 
PRC forces, equipment and structures from the Spratly islands.  These operations would 
undoubtedly provoke a negative response from Beijing, thereby risking a direct conflict 
between the United States and China.  Additionally, this option risks an increased 
regional perception of the United States as interfering with regional affairs and 
potentially having hegemonic ambitions in Southeast Asia.  Such a perception could 
damage, at least temporarily, U.S. ties with the other claimants in Southeast Asia, 
creating another downhill track on the “image roller coaster” discussed earlier.  At a 
minimum, this course of action would involve increasing the U.S. naval presence in the 
region until Philippine forces could effectively assert their legitimized territorial claims.  
Given their current naval capabilities, this would mean a significant commitment of U.S. 
forces. 
b. Consolidate Southeast Asia Support Against PRC Claims 
While not backing specific claims, the United States could increase its 
interaction with the ASEAN members to resist Chinese claims in the South China Sea.  
This would likely involve an increased effort to the current U.S. program of providing 
arms, military training, and economic aid to its allies in the region.  However, the United 
States would be hard pressed to convince ASEAN members to take this course of action.  
ASEAN’s latest agreements with Beijing in 2002, establishing a free trade zone and the 
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, may not be precisely what all ASEAN 
members desired, but they are indicative of momentum towards an ASEAN engagement 
policy with China, rather than containment.  Additionally, the economic benefits derived 
from engagement come at a crucial time for ASEAN members, as few have fully 
recovered from the 1997 financial crisis.  Consequently, ASEAN is unlikely to reverse  
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course, even if the United States offers lucrative military and economic incentives, 
especially in light of perceptions that the United States either ignored or exploited Asia’s 
financial situation during the crisis. 
c. Wait It Out 
Given the current difficulties the United States is experiencing in inserting 
itself into sovereignty issues (Afghanistan and Iraq), this policy would receive significant 
public support domestically and internationally.  However, this policy offers the United 
States no guarantee of continued access to the South China Sea region, let alone safe 
passage through the area as recognized sovereignty over the region would allow a foreign 
capital to restrict access and passage through blockades, quarantines and other political 
and military means.  While this is certainly an extreme case, an ICJ decision breaking the 
South China Sea into a jigsaw of internal and territorial waters would greatly reduce the 
freedom of navigation that U.S.-flagged vessels currently enjoy in the region.  The 
likelihood of such a decision is low, but it remains possible.  Granted, as long as the 2002 
declaration holds, there is little threat to U.S. interests, but this could quickly change if 
one or more claimants decide to deviate from the behaviors called for in the declaration.  
Currently, the United States could rapidly respond to such a scenario but without 
continued monitoring of the region and as well as continued political and military 
planning, one cannot guarantee that this will always be the case. 
d. Support a Multilateral Approach 
Recent literature suggests the establishment of a collective regional body 
to manage the South China Sea region and its resources.160  Such an agreement would 
eliminate the territorial concerns while ensuring that all claimants received a portion of 
whatever natural resources lie in the region.  Additionally, by avoiding any one nation 
having political authority over the South China Sea territories, the likelihood of 
maintaining freedom of access and navigation would be maintained at its current status, 
possibly improved.  However, the watering down of ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea to a mere declaration presumably stemmed from the inability of the 
ASEAN nations to put aside their differences to reach collective compromises.  
Meanwhile, Beijing adopted a “sit and wait” strategy in the hopes its willingness to hold 
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out for a less restrictive agreement would outlast ASEAN’s desire to tie China’s hands.  
This allowed Beijing to firmly insist that the document avoid being specific regarding 
several key issues.  The United States could, during normal diplomatic interactions, offer 
advice to the ASEAN members, pressing each towards a consolidated position that 
ensures continued freedom of access and navigation in the South China Sea region 
unofficially.  Additionally, the United States could go as far as conditioning trade and 
economic and military aid packages on such behavior.  This policy allows the United 
States indirect, but influential inputs into the outcomes of the disputes. 
e. Pressure Claimants to Settle in Accordance with the 1982 
UNCLOS 
All claimants except Taiwan, which has no UN representation, are 
signatories to the 1982 UNCLOS.  While each nation made declarations regarding the 
UNCLOS at the signing or during their respective ratification processes, none specifically 
mentioned its disputed South China Sea territories. 161   By omitting geographical 
specifics, the claimants wished to avoid the conditions of the UNCLOS regarding the 
disputed South China Sea territories.  However, while the vague verbiage of these 
declarations arguably makes the applicability of the UNCLOS to the South China Sea 
disputes questionable, it also does not specifically exempt these claims.  The United 
States could press the claimants and the UN to, in the interest of regional peace and 
stability and international well being, address the South China Sea disputes in accordance 
with the UNCLOS.   
The terms of international law still allow the claimants to settle the 
disputes through a multitude of bilateral and multilateral approaches, including 
arbitration by a third party.  However, once international law is invoked, if the claimants 
cannot settle the disputes themselves, the International Court of Justice will ultimately 
settle the matter.162  Once the ICJ decides, there is little room left for interpretation and 
the United States will be obliged to support the decision, even if it negatively impacts 
U.S. interests, though the Malaysia-Indonesia ruling cited in Chapter II shows that the 
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ICJ does not always address the true cause of the disputes, in this case the region’s 
natural resources.  It is for this very reason that it remains unlikely that the claimants will 
agree to defer the South China Sea disputes to an international body, thereby reducing the 
viability of this approach. 
While the intention of the UNCLOS clearly is to preserve the rights of 
both the coastal states and those states traversing foreign territorial waters and EEZs, the 
possibility exists that governments could abuse their UNCLOS rights.  Foreign 
government could harass foreign-flagged ships in their territorial waters and EEZs.  If the 
South China Sea became the internal waters of one or more claimants, this harassment 
could include frequent interceptions and boardings, targeting only ships of certain 
countries, e.g. the United States and its allies to the arrest of U.S. ship captains and crews.  
The UNCLOS does not state what evidence coastal states must present to warrant such 
activities, allowing for manufactured suspicions that U.S. citizens engage in activities 
harmful to that government’s interpretation of its sovereign rights while in their internal 
or territorial waters.  While an extremely unlikely scenario, this type of activity could 
significantly slow the maritime trade through the region, potentially impacting the 
economies of the United States and its trading partners. 
f. Policy Recommendation 
It is imperative that the United States maintain continued access to and 
passage through the South China Sea.  Consequently, while non-interference is the most 
unselfish policy in the worldview, the United States simply cannot afford this approach.  
However, the United States also cannot afford to risk direct conflict with any of the 
claimants, particularly China.  Accordingly, the United States must work to prevent any 
encroachment of freedom of navigation throughout the region.  Instead, in the short term, 
the United States must publicly and enthusiastically support the 2002 ASEAN 
Declaration of Conduct while emphasizing monitoring and enforcement in the spirit of 
the UNCLOS. 
The backing of the United States for this Declaration, while it continually 
presses for a more binding code of conduct that would guarantee freedom of navigation 
in the region, could be enough to raise the consequences of aggression and conflict to an 
unacceptable level for all parties.  It will certainly check any Chinese ambitions to 
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occupy further disputed territories.  However, by supporting a regional multinational 
convention, such as a Sino-ASEAN Code of Conduct, the United States avoids taking 
sides, instead showing public support for freedom of navigation in the region as well as 
allowing the ASEAN members and Beijing to approach the subject diplomatically but 
without Western powers or the UN having direct influence.   
E. CONCLUSION 
There is little potential for direct U.S. involvement in conflicts over the South 
China Sea territories.  Despite some misguided interpretations of the U.S.-Philippines 
MDT, military actions against Kalaya’an or Mischief Reef are credibly excludable from 
the treaty and subsequently, not a U.S. problem.  However, should Washington deem 
direct involvement is in the U.S. national interest, a vehicle to accomplish this is the 
reinterpretation of the U.S.-Philippine treaty, though this thesis does not recommend such 
action.  On the other hand, involvement in regional conflict rarely serves U.S. interests.  
The continued flow of maritime trade through the South China Sea region and the need 
for a Southeast Asian perception of the United States as trustworthy and formally neutral 
in regional matters weighs heavily on what makes a policy approach to the territorial 
disputes politically, militarily, and economically feasible.  Consequently, the best 
approach for the United States is to remain distantly and informally affiliated with the 
issue as long as military tensions remain low and maritime traffic continues to traverse 
the region unimpeded and duty free. 
To ensure this remains the case, the United States should increase its attempts to 
indirectly influence Sino-ASEAN negotiations while encouraging deeper 
military-to-military ties and regional naval exercises among ARF members.  
Simultaneously, the United States should seek to increase its involvement in these 
regional exchanges and exercises.  These opportunities for increased U.S.-ASEAN 
interaction can further develop U.S. ties with ASEAN leaders and personnel while 
providing the U.S. military experience in the South China Sea waters.  Additionally, 
these events demonstrate the ability of U.S. forces to ensure the safe passage of merchant 
ships in the event that escort operations become necessary.  Meanwhile, the United States 
must also exert gentle but sustained diplomatic pressure on all parties, including China, to  
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reach a collective agreement on the territorial disputes that includes clearly defined and 
supportable monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, but does not unnecessarily 





Despite a lack of compelling evidence, all of the South China Sea claimants 
continue to assert their claims to the region’s land, water, and resources.  They justify 
their claims with “historical” evidence, irrelevant under international law, and debatable 
interpretations of these same laws, interpretations that none of the other claimants, or the 
rest of the world for that matter, currently agree with.  Regardless, the disputes continue 
and consequently, it appears that they will remain unresolved for the foreseeable future.  
As Chapter II presented, no particular claim initiated the rush to enforce claims, as each 
claimant government was largely uninterested in the territories until the late 1960s.  
There are two discernible patterns regarding claims and assertions in the South China Sea.  
First, plans and actions to unilaterally occupy, survey, or exploit the region spur negative 
responses, and often counteractions, from the other claimants.  Second, as the data in 
Chapter III demonstrated, Beijing’s attempts to militarily assert its claims and affect the 
region’s politics through coercion negatively impact China’s ability to export its goods.   
This thesis demonstrates that China’s attempts to assert its claims does not stem 
from a desire to establish, or as some would argue reestablish, hegemony over the South 
China Sea.  ASEAN’s continued refusal to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the region, 
even after Beijing’s calculated generosity during the Asian financial crisis, shows that 
China is not bullying its Southeast Asian neighbors.  Instead, China’s claims stem from 
its requirements for energy resources and unfettered trade with, and shipping through, the 
South China Sea region.  This argument also explains China’s shift in approach to the 
disputes, from military coercion and aggression, to bilateral negotiations, and finally, 
multilateral agreements. 
China, and perhaps all the claimants, shifted from military solutions to the South 
China Sea territorial disputes because doing so best served their national interests.  
China‘s primary interest is the continuation of a stable domestic order, which Beijing 
believes requires continued economic growth.  To achieve this growth, China realized 
that it must vastly increase its trade with the global economic community and 
subsequently, must integrate itself with the international order.  Essentially, China has 
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finally begun its version of Japan’s Meiji Restoration, a “Deng-Jiang-Hu revolution” if 
you will.  This transformation involves the depolitization of the PLA and its components, 
and the professionalization of the Chinese polity and bureaucracy.  The process is by no 
means complete, but there are undeniable signs of progress towards a modern and 
“normal” China.  However, this does not mean that U.S.-Sino relations will be smooth.  
China and the United States share a myriad of national interests, including feeding 
rapidly increasing energy demands in both nations and it is likely that these two nations 
will pursue competition in some pursuits and cooperation in others.  Consequently, it is 
imperative that the United States continually study what Chinese interests are and what 
decisions Beijing makes in their pursuit.   
One factor, which eases this study, is that China’s military, once a dominant actor 
in Chinese politics, now appears to be approaching a role more in line with the U.S. 
defense establishment – one of consultation and advice regarding the nation’s security 
and little more.  However, the Chinese “fourth generation” leadership is vastly different 
from previous regimes.  No longer can the United States rely on pure ideology to guide 
its observations of China’s polity.  While the Hu administration is better educated, widely 
traveled, and more aware of the international political and economic environment than 
the Deng and Jiang regimes could ever have hoped to be, it also is harder to predict as it 
attempts to answer concerns from a growing number and variety of domestic actors.  
Additionally, China’s current leaders are becoming increasingly comfortable and adept at 
using the tools of international politics, diplomacy, and economics to pursue their 
nation’s interests.  However, they have not entirely placed their faith in the international 
system to pursue and attain these interests; arguably, no nation has.  Like its counterparts 
in Washington, Beijing continues the professionalization and modernization of its 
military in order to hedge its bets should peaceful mechanisms fail.  The result of this is 
an increasingly shrewd and more engaged China, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, but 
progressively more so around the globe.  The dragon is indeed awakening and finally 
approaching an ability to use its burgeoning power.  However, this does not mean that 
China’s actions are unconstrained. 
Until 2002, Beijing refused to participate in multilateral negotiations regarding 
the South China Sea territories, and a host of other issues.  However, despite its looming 
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size and growing military capacity, the ASEAN nations, along with the rest of the world, 
hold a powerful tool – trade.  Chinese actions in the mid-1990s and 2001 spurred a 
negative economic response from ASEAN and the United States.  While continuing to 
export their own goods and commodities to China they slowed, and sometimes reversed, 
the rate of Chinese imports during these periods, potentially endangering the economic 
growth necessary for continued domestic stability in China.  Once Beijing adjusted its 
behavior to alleviate concerns in ASEAN and the United States, Chinese exports to these 
countries resumed their rapid growth.  The correlation is undeniable and too cyclical to 
be mere coincidence, thereby demonstrating that economic interdependence theorists are 
onto something, at least in Asia.  Consequently, the guarantee of continued access to the 
South China Sea’s maritime trade routes is of great importance to U.S. national interests.  
One traditional method of protecting U.S. interests in any region is a myriad of security 
treaties.  However, in the South China Sea region, there is only one such arrangement, the 
U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. 
The U.S.-Philippines treaty must remain unchanged, that is, focused on the 
metropolitan area and Filipino territorial boundaries as set in 1951.  To include Manila’s 
claims in the Spratly Islands risks emboldening the Philippine government to renew its 
military assertion of these claims before China completes its military modernization.  
Ironically, the increased Sino-Philippine ties that some in the U.S. fear so greatly also 
serves to dissuade military adventurism by Manila.  Improved ties with China appear to 
make Manila feel more secure, thereby decreasing calls for an expanded Philippine 
defense perimeter, calls which often include the assertion and occupation of Spratly 
Islands.  The increased engagement of Southeast Asian nations to support the GWOT 
should continue, not only to complete that necessary and noble mission, but also to 
ensure that the United States maintains continued and unfettered access to the region.  
The focus on anti-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts serves to benefit all parties.  The 
placement of these disputes in a regional body could still maintain the status quo – a 
peaceful, open waterway conducive to the free flowing maritime trade that benefits all of 
the claimants and the United States.   
The internationalization of the disputes, however, risks a definitive decision on 
who owns what.  The outcome of such a decision, particular in the worst scenario case 
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that the ICJ ruled in China’s favor, could negatively impact U.S. interests in the region.  
Additionally, the ICJ could repeat the mistake of its 2002 ruling on the Malaysia-
Indonesia dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, ignoring the heart of the dispute 
– natural resources – and consequently prolong, or possibly even intensify, the disputes 
rather than settle them.  To avoid either situation, the United States should continue its 
engagement of both China and ASEAN. 
For the short term, the United States should support adherence to the 2002 
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” while increasing its 
attempts to indirectly influence Sino-ASEAN negotiations.  Additionally, the United 
States should encourage deeper military-to-military ties and regional naval exercises 
among ARF members.  The U.S. government must also seek out opportunities to improve 
its image in the region and then make use of these improvements to exercise moderate, 
but persistent pressure on all claimants, including China, to reach a multilateral resolution 
of the territorial disputes.  Most importantly, this resolution must clearly define 
mechanisms to monitor the region and enforce the resolution, particular regarding the 
drilling for and extraction of natural resources, but without interrupting freedom of 
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